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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
Defendant-appellant Askia Washington was ensnared 
by a “stash house reverse sting” operation—one which hit 
many of the by-now-familiar beats.1  Acting on what 
appeared to be insider information from a drug courier, 
Washington and his three co-conspirators planned to rob a 
Philadelphia property where they thought 10 kilograms of 
cocaine were being stored for distribution.  But as they 
discovered on the day of the robbery, the “stash house” was a 
                                              
1 See United States v. Pedrin, 797 F.3d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 
2015) (explaining the basic framework of stash house reverse 
sting operations), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2401 (2016). 
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trap set by law enforcement.  Their “courier” was an 
undercover federal agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), which had 
developed the scenario from the ground up.  The cocaine did 
not exist.   
Under federal law on conspiracy and attempt, the 
government could, and did, prosecute the crew as if fantasy 
had been reality.  Washington, the sole member to take his 
chances at trial, was convicted by a jury of two Hobbs Act 
robbery charges and two drug charges (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 
and 21 U.S.C. § 846), although he was acquitted on a gun 
charge.   
Developed by the ATF in the 1980s to combat a rise in 
professional robbery crews targeting stash houses, reverse 
sting operations have grown increasingly controversial over 
the years, even as they have grown safer and more refined.  
For one, they empower law enforcement to craft offenses out 
of whole cloth, often corresponding to statutory offense 
thresholds.  Here, the entirely fictitious 10 kilograms of 
cocaine triggered a very real 20-year mandatory minimum for 
Washington, contributing to a total sentence of 264 months in 
prison—far more than even the ringleader of the conspiracy 
received.  For another, and as Washington claimed on 
multiple occasions before the District Court—and now again 
on appeal—people of color are allegedly swept up in the 
stings in disproportionate numbers.   
These elements of controversy are bound up in the 
three claims Washington now raises on appeal.  Two are 
constitutional claims: Washington challenges his conviction 
and sentence by arguing that the use of the statutory 
mandatory minimum term violated his rights to due process, 
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and he also alleges that the attorney who represented him at 
trial rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.  While 
stash-house reverse stings can raise constitutional concerns, 
the use of a mandatory minimum sentence on these particular 
facts did not deprive Washington of his right to due process.  
And while this is the rare case where a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was properly raised on direct appeal 
instead of through a collateral attack, Washington has not 
shown prejudice sufficient to call into doubt the integrity of 
his trial.  We thus conclude that both constitutional claims are 
without merit.   
The remaining claim challenges the District Court’s 
decision to deny Washington pretrial discovery on ATF’s 
operations and enforcement statistics.  Washington contends 
that, in denying his motion, the District Court erroneously 
relied on the hard-to-meet test for “selective prosecution” 
discovery developed by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Armstrong2 and United States v. Bass3 (which we will refer to 
as “Armstrong/Bass”).  He encourages us to follow instead 
the en banc Seventh Circuit’s recent opinion in United States 
v. Davis,4 which distinguished between claims of selective 
prosecution and selective law enforcement and appeared to 
endorse a relaxed discovery standard for the latter.   
Like the Seventh Circuit, we conclude that the 
proposed distinction between enforcement and prosecution is 
well taken, and that the law supports greater flexibility when 
                                              
2 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
3 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam). 
4 793 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  
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the discretionary decisions of law enforcement, rather than 
those of prosecutors, are targeted by a defendant’s request for 
discovery.  We therefore hold that a district court may 
exercise its discretion to grant limited discovery, or otherwise 
to conduct in camera analysis of government data before 
deciding whether limited discovery is warranted.  A district 
court may do so even if a defendant seeking discovery on a 
selective enforcement claim has not otherwise met his or her 
full burden under Armstrong/Bass.  Because the District 
Court in this case thought that its discretion was cabined by 
Armstrong/Bass, and because we cannot otherwise say that 
the same result would have occurred under the standard we 
announce today, we will vacate the orders denying discovery 
and remand for limited post-judgment proceedings.  The 
judgment of conviction and sentence are otherwise unaffected 
by this remand.  
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I. BACKGROUND  
A. The Plan5 
Codefendant and ringleader Dwight Berry came to the 
attention of the ATF in late 2012, when he made it known 
that he was interested in conducting robberies of drug users 
and dealers.  In the course of asking around, Berry spoke to 
an acquaintance who, unbeknownst to him, was an ATF 
confidential informant (“CI”).  The CI alerted the ATF, which 
determined that Berry’s criminal history fit its required 
profile for a sting operation and opened an investigation in 
February 2013, under the supervision of ATF Special Agent 
John Bowman.  From here on out, many of the meetings and 
phone calls about the developing robbery plan would be 
surreptitiously recorded for playback at trial.  
 Meanwhile, the CI kept Berry on the line with word of 
a connection: a drug-courier friend who frequented a South 
Philadelphia stash house on his trips to and from New York.  
When Berry and the CI met again, they were joined by the 
                                              
5 Our description of the trial and underlying scheme is drawn 
primarily from the District Court’s opinion denying 
Washington’s motion for a new trial, United States v. 
Washington [hereinafter “Washington New Trial”], 184 F. 
Supp. 3d 149 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  Washington accepts the 
factual accuracy of the District Court’s opinion, see 
Washington Br. at 7 n.4, and both parties have structured their 
briefs around it.  As Washington is not challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we strive to recite the facts in a 
balanced manner.  See United States v. Cox, 851 F.3d 113, 
118 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017).   
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supposed drug courier—in reality, undercover ATF Special 
Agent Patrick Edwards, a veteran of over a dozen robbery 
scenarios.  In his role as the courier, Edwards reported seeing 
over 10 kilograms of cocaine (in the context of cocaine 
“bricks”) inside a cooler during a trip to the stash house.  
Berry indicated that he knew of a crew who might be 
interested in participating in the robbery and that he was 
willing to engage in violence if necessary. 
Washington first entered the picture about a week and 
a half after this encounter as one of two members of Berry’s 
proposed robbery crew (the other man, never identified, 
apparently dropped out of the plan shortly afterwards).  At 
another meeting in early March 2013 with Berry, Edwards, 
and the CI, Washington probed Edwards about the logistics of 
the robbery: what level of resistance they could expect, 
whether the house would be watched from the outside, and so 
on.  Prompted by Edwards, the conspirators also discussed 
how to move and sell the stolen cocaine.6   
                                              
6 As captured by the recording, and as later explained at trial, 
the conspirators made frequent reference to “jawns” or 
“jauns,” a distinctive Philadelphia regionalism that serves as a 
wildcard stand-in for other nouns.  See Dan Nosowitz, The 
Enduring Mystery Of ‘Jawn’, Philadelphia’s All-Purpose 
Noun, Atlas Obscura, 
http://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/the-enduring-mystery-
of-jawn-philadelphias-allpurpose-noun (last visited Aug. 21, 
2017; archived at https://perma.cc/6XM6-JQEW); see also 
United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 200 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“Apparently, ‘jawn’ is slang for any noun, and throughout 
this case it was used variously to describe a car, cocaine, a 
nightclub, and a beeper.”).  
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In a subsequent phone discussion, Edwards pressed 
Berry on the professionalism of his crew.  Berry, in an 
attempt to reassure, told Edwards that “[t]his is what [our 
crew] do[es].”7  When Edwards singled out Washington for 
concern over a perceived lack of robbery experience, Berry 
said that Washington “rock[ed] out” and “put work in,” which 
Edwards interpreted to mean that Washington was some sort 
of shooter or enforcer.8   
On the day of the robbery, Washington and Berry met 
at Berry’s mother’s house, where Berry picked up two guns 
and hid them in an Eggo Waffles box.  The group, which had 
added two new members—codefendants Antonio Ellis and 
Jermau Johnston—then gathered in the parking lot of the 
Philadelphia Airport Hilton to review its plan.  (Washington’s 
girlfriend was also present, although she did not participate 
and remained in her parked car.)  Edwards went over the 
salient details once more, emphasizing the 10 kilograms of 
cocaine and explaining that no money would be found in the 
house.   
In three cars—Berry, Ellis, and Johnston in a minivan; 
Washington and his girlfriend (the latter driving) following 
behind in a Chrysler 300; and Agent Edwards bringing up the 
rear—the crew made its way to the chosen address on 
Passyunk Avenue in southwest Philadelphia.  As the caravan 
moved in, agents swooped down.  All but Berry surrendered; 
Berry fled on foot but was apprehended shortly afterwards.  
From the minivan, law enforcement recovered two guns, 
ammo, gloves, and zip-ties.  From Washington’s Chrysler 
                                              
7 Supplemental Appendix (S.A.) 55.   
8 S.A. 60–61.    
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300, they recovered a backpack, gloves, a mask, a lighter, and 
lighter fluid.   
B. Procedural History 
What follows is an abbreviated summary of the 
criminal proceedings, setting up the claims that Washington 
now raises on appeal.  We will return in greater detail to the 
salient parts later, in the Analysis section of this opinion.  
1. Indictment; Codefendants Plead 
Guilty 
In April 2013, the four men were indicted in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Counts 1 and 2 of the 
indictment charged attempt/conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 
robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), while counts 3 and 4 charged 
attempt/conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five 
kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846 through 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)).  Count 5 charged all of the 
defendants with carrying a firearm during a crime of violence 
(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) and count 6 charged all but Johnston 
with being felons in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1)).9  
Washington’s codefendants eventually pleaded guilty.  
Johnson and Ellis received 27-month and 46-month 
sentences, respectively.  Although Berry, the ringleader, faced 
                                              
9 The government later obtained a superseding indictment 
against Washington.  A minor modification of the original, it 
focused on Washington as a defendant and amplified a few of 
the factual allegations.      
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a Guidelines range of 270–322 months, his binding plea 
agreement reflected a 180-month sentence,10 and the 
government did not seek to formally introduce his previous, 
eligible convictions to secure an enhanced mandatory 
minimum penalty.  Berry ultimately received the agreed-upon 
180-month custodial sentence. 
Unlike his codefendants, Washington pleaded not 
guilty and prepared for trial.  He was assigned a Criminal 
Justice Act attorney, whom we will refer to as the “defense 
counsel” or “trial counsel.”  
2. Motion for Discovery 
During the pretrial phase, Washington moved (both 
pro se and through trial counsel) for discovery relating to 
sting operations and related prosecutions, which he claimed to 
be racially motivated.  Trial counsel’s filing cited three prior 
federal prosecutions in which all of the defendants were 
African American.  The moving papers also clarified that the 
discovery was sought not for trial defense, but rather to 
support a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of 
“racial profiling or selective prosecution . . . by the 
Philadelphia District Office of [ATF] . . . in complicity with” 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office.11   
After oral argument, and as set forth in a thoughtful 
opinion, the District Court denied Washington’s motion for 
discovery.  Finding the Armstrong/Bass standard to control, 
                                              
10 Plea agreements under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) “bind[] 
the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.” 
11 Discovery Motion at 1, ECF No. 126.   
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the District Court held that Washington failed to meet this 
“rigorous standard to obtain discovery,”12 and later denied 
Washington’s requests for reconsideration.   
3. Recordings Deemed Admissible; 
Government Seeks Enhanced 
Mandatory Penalties 
With discovery denied, Washington did not file an 
actual motion to dismiss the indictment, and the parties 
otherwise prepared for trial.  In an important ruling, the 
District Court decided that the government could use the 
audio and video recordings and related transcripts at trial.  
Meanwhile, the government filed a 21 U.S.C. § 851 
information stating that Washington had a prior Pennsylvania 
drug felony conviction from 2004—a prerequisite to 
enhanced mandatory minimum penalties at sentencing.   
4. The District Court Revisits Discovery on 
the Eve of Trial 
In June 2015, prior to opening statements, the District 
Court revisited the matter of discovery in the context of trial 
defenses.  Referring back to United States v. Alexander,13 a 
Northern District of Illinois opinion cited in the earlier 
decision denying discovery, the District Court ordered the 
government to release redacted portions of an ATF policy 
                                              
12 United States v. Washington [hereinafter “Washington 
Discovery”], No. 13-171-2, 2014 WL 2959493, at *7 (E.D. 
Pa. June 30, 2014).   
13 No. 11 CR 148-1, 2013 WL 6491476 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 
2013). 
 12 
 
manual on stash house sting operations—patterned after the 
disclosures ordered in Alexander.  The District Court then 
issued a protective order restricting defense counsel’s use of 
the disclosed material.   
5. Washington’s Trial 
Over the five-day trial, defense counsel used the ATF 
disclosures to advance his theory of the case: Washington did 
not have the requisite intent to commit a dubious, 
discriminatory “conspiracy” that ATF had designed from the 
ground up.14  For instance, counsel pointed to Washington’s 
use of a separate vehicle and the presence of his girlfriend on 
the day of the robbery to suggest that he was cautious and not 
fully committed.  Counsel also utilized the disclosed ATF 
materials to cross-examine supervising ATF Agent Bowman.   
But during that cross-examination, trial counsel 
appeared to fumble.  He was attempting to show that, as 
Agent Bowman would later admit, the only person “targeted” 
by the ATF prior to the arrest was Berry, and that the ATF 
knew nothing about the other conspirators and could not have 
ensured that they fit its target profile, which required (in part) 
a violent criminal history.  But in addition to asking whether 
Washington had a prior robbery arrest (which he did not), 
trial counsel also asked Agent Bowman whether Washington 
had a drug arrest.  This question effectively allowed the 
prosecution to bring out Washington’s prior drug conviction 
on redirect.   
                                              
14 We note that entrapment was not raised as a defense and is 
not now at issue on appeal.   
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6. The Jury Verdict 
The jury returned a guilty verdict on counts one 
through four of the superseding indictment: the drug and 
Hobbs Act robbery charges.  It returned a not-guilty verdict 
on firearm count five; firearm count six was dismissed on the 
government’s motion.15  The jury specifically found that the 
government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
(fictitious) cocaine at the center of the conspiracy was five 
kilograms or more.   
7. Pre-Sentencing Investigation into Trial 
Counsel’s Constitutional Effectiveness 
Shortly after the trial, Washington wrote a letter to the 
District Court requesting a substitution of attorney.  He 
alleged, in part, that trial counsel had been under the 
influence of alcohol throughout the trial.   
The District Court swiftly reacted, appointing a new 
Criminal Justice Act attorney, Mark Greenberg—who has 
represented Washington ever since—in what became, in 
effect, a pre-sentencing investigation of trial counsel’s 
performance.  After the District Court held an evidentiary 
hearing, Attorney Greenberg filed a formal motion for new 
trial predicated on the alleged ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  This motion included an attack on trial counsel’s 
questions during cross-examination of Agent Bowman that 
opened the door to the introduction of Washington’s drug 
conviction.  The motion was ultimately denied, with the 
District Court finding in part that the “mountain” of evidence 
                                              
15 See Order, ECF No. 219. 
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against Washington forestalled a showing of prejudice under 
the two-part Strickland v. Washington16 test for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.17   
8. Sentencing Proceedings 
The ineffectiveness question resolved for the time 
being, the parties and District Court prepared for sentencing.  
Because of his criminal history, Washington was classified as 
a “Career Offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines.  As a 
result of Guidelines calculations we need not delve into, that 
Career Offender status overrode the lower Guidelines level 
derived from quantity of drugs, yielding a sentencing range of 
360 months to life in prison.18   
In his sentencing memoranda, Washington challenged 
the proposed sentencing range, emphasizing the troubling 
nature of the sting operation and requesting that the District 
Court take into account the sentences of his co-conspirators.  
He also asked the District Court to disregard the mandatory 
minimum sentence of 20 years; if “the reverse sting in this 
case involved 0.9 kilograms of non-existent cocaine,” he 
argued, “Mr. Washington would not be facing a mandatory 
minimum sentence.”19  In response, the government 
emphasized that the mandatory minimum penalty was just 
that: mandatory.   Evincing some discomfort with the 20-
year mandatory minimum, the District Court nevertheless 
                                              
16 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
17 See Washington New Trial, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 160–62. 
18 See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). 
19 Supplemental Sentencing Memorandum at 2, ECF No. 275.   
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ruled that he was “bound to follow the law,”20 imposing a 24-
month sentence on the Hobbs Act robbery charges and a 240-
month consecutive sentence on the drug charges for a total 
term of 264 months’ imprisonment.  Washington timely 
appealed.21   
II. Analysis  
Washington’s constitutional challenges, which directly 
attack the judgment of conviction and sentence, are 
considered first.  We will then turn to his Armstrong/Bass 
discovery claim.  
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Although he again invokes trial counsel’s alcohol use, 
Washington otherwise limits his ineffectiveness claim on 
appeal to the incident where trial counsel opened the door to 
testimony about his drug conviction.  He attacks the District 
Court’s determination that the “overwhelming” evidence at 
trial precluded a showing of prejudice, and emphasizes, in 
particular, the jury’s acquittal on the firearm count and an 
alleged conflation of the prejudicial impact of the admission 
on the robbery counts with the far-greater impact on the drug 
counts.  
                                              
20 S.A. 211.  
21 We have appellate jurisdiction through 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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1. Ineffectiveness Claims on Direct 
Appeal 
We open with the observation that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are generally not considered on 
direct appeal.  Instead, they are more commonly brought in a 
collateral proceeding, such as through a post-conviction 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate.22   
Our “general aversion”23 to reaching ineffectiveness 
claims on direct appeal derives in part from their inherently 
collateral nature.  The trial record, concerned as it is with the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence, will not in most instances be 
“developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving 
the [ineffective assistance] claim and thus [will] often [be] 
incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.”24  Deferring the 
question of ineffectiveness to collateral review also protects 
                                              
22 United States v. Hankerson, 496 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 
2007).   
23 Gov’t of the V.I. v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
24 Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); 
see also United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 547, 556 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he lack of a fully developed record often 
precludes a comprehensive inquiry into the elements of 
strategy or tactics that may have entered into defense 
counsel’s challenged decision.”).   
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criminal defendants from the consequences of resolving the 
claims prematurely.25   
While cautioning that we will not “open[] the door to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal as a 
matter of course,” we have nevertheless recognized an 
exception to the rule when the trial record “is sufficient to 
allow determination of ineffective assistance of counsel.”26  
Determining sufficiency is case- and claim-dependent. 
We think that Washington’s is the uncommon case 
where resolving an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal is 
both feasible and efficient.  Strictly speaking, he is not raising 
ineffectiveness for “the first time” on appeal.  Rather, 
ineffectiveness was invoked in and resolved by the District 
Court, which held a post-trial, pre-sentencing hearing at 
which Washington and the AUSA both testified (trial counsel 
was invited to testify, but declined).  The District Court—the 
trial judge—then denied the claim against the backdrop of the 
recently concluded trial.27  This development of the record 
                                              
25 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 849 F.3d 87, 90 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (“To spare Brown from having res judicata attach 
to the ineffective assistance claim, we decline to address it 
here.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
26 United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 520 & n.2 (quoting 
United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 
1991)).   
27 See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 506 (“[T]he § 2255 motion often 
will be ruled upon by the same district judge who presided at 
trial.  The judge, having observed the earlier trial, should have 
an advantageous perspective for determining the effectiveness 
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amounted to, in effect, a mini collateral proceeding, akin to 
what is ordinarily expected under § 2255.  It provides us with 
a sufficient foundation for direct appellate review.28  We 
therefore exercise our discretion to reach the ineffectiveness 
claim.29 
                                                                                                     
of counsel’s conduct and whether any deficiencies were 
prejudicial.”).   
28 See United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 
2003) (reaching ineffectiveness claim when District Court 
“conducted a hearing with [the defendant] and his new 
counsel where it specifically considered . . . allegations 
concerning the representation he received from his prior 
counsel”).  The appendix as initially compiled lacked most of 
the ineffectiveness-stage papers and transcripts, outside of the 
District Court’s decision itself and a single page of 
Washington’s new-trial motion.  We asked the government to 
supplement our record with the relevant filings (which are all 
sealed on the District Court docket and, as a result, are not 
readily available to us), so as to allow for the determination of 
the sufficiency of the trial record and a more-searching 
review of Washington’s ineffectiveness claim.  We thank the 
government for filing the supplement.        
29 We note that Washington initially asked for substitution of 
counsel, but not a full hearing on trial counsel’s constitutional 
effectiveness.  A district court is ordinarily required to warn 
pro se litigants when a filing recharacterization might 
implicate the second-or-successiveness bar of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  See 
Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383 (2003); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b). However, Washington’s recharacterized filing 
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2. Strickland v. Washington and 
Standard of Review 
“Regardless of whether an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is raised in a motion for a new trial, on 
collateral review, or on direct appeal, the standard of review 
is the same.”30  Under the familiar two-part standard 
established in Strickland v. Washington,31 Washington bears 
the burden of showing 1) that trial counsel’s actions “were 
not supported by a reasonable strategy” and 2) that trial 
                                                                                                     
could not be counted as an initial 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, as 
he was not yet “in custody under sentence of a [federal] 
court.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see also United States v. 
Stockstill, 26 F.3d 492, 497 n.10 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Because 
[the defendant] advanced his claims prior to sentencing, a 
§ 2255 motion would not have been appropriate at the 
time.”).  Because the § 2244(b) bar was not implicated, and 
because the mere possibility of preclusion does not otherwise 
“significantly alter[]” Washington’s rights, no warning was 
necessary here.  Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).  But see Mui v. United States, 614 
F.3d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We hold that a defendant who 
raises on direct appeal ineffective assistance claims based on 
the strategies, actions, or inactions of counsel that can be, and 
are, adjudicated on the merits on the trial record, is precluded 
from raising new or repetitive claims based on the same 
strategies, actions, or inactions in a Section 2255 
proceeding.”). 
30 United States v. Bishop, 629 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2010).   
31 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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counsel’s errors were prejudicial.32  “[B]oth deficiency and 
prejudice must be proven to have a valid claim for relief.”33  
On appeal of the District Court’s decision, we exercise 
plenary review over the legal components of ineffectiveness, 
assess any underlying findings of fact for clear error, and 
“exercise independent judgment on whether those facts, as 
found by the District Court, show that counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance.”34   
We agree with the District Court that the general 
allegations of alcohol use do not require a departure from 
Strickland’s two-prong standard—a point conceded by 
Washington in his new-trial memorandum.35  Alcohol or drug 
use by trial counsel can certainly be relevant to both parts of 
an ineffectiveness inquiry, especially if amplified or systemic, 
or on close questions of strategy and jury perception.  But on 
these facts, alleged substance abuse is not, without more, one 
of the rare forms of dereliction amounting to the per se denial 
                                              
32 Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505.   
33 United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 289–90 (3d Cir. 
2014).   
34 United States v. Davenport, 775 F.3d 605, 608 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
35 See Washington New Trial, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 157; Sealed 
Supplemental Appendix 78; see also United States v. Cronic, 
466 U.S. 648, 659–60 & nn.25–26 (1984).   
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of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.36   
3. Trial Counsel’s Cross-Examination 
of Agent Bowman 
Washington now limits his ineffectiveness allegation 
to the cross-examination of ATF Agent John Bowman, which 
allowed the prosecutor to bring out Washington’s previous 
drug conviction on redirect.  He argues that trial counsel’s 
line of questioning lacked a strategic basis and caused him 
prejudice, as it undermined the “not committed to the crime” 
theory of defense.   
By way of background: Agent Bowman, who managed 
the ATF’s investigation of the conspiracy, was called to 
testify as the government’s final witness.  His testimony 
established, among other things, the authenticity of the 
recorded calls and meetings among the conspirators (or 
“conspirator,” in the case of the undercover Agent Edwards) 
and their incriminating nature.  For instance, Bowman 
                                              
36 See Williams v. Trammell, 782 F.3d 1184, 1200–01 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (analyzing substance abuse ineffectiveness under 
Strickland), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 806 (2016); Frye v. Lee, 
235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n order for an 
attorney’s alcohol addiction to make his assistance 
constitutionally ineffective, there must be specific instances 
of deficient performance attributable to alcohol.”); see also 
Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[U]nder 
Strickland the fact that an attorney used drugs is not, in and of 
itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance claim.” (emphasis 
in original)). 
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testified that at the March 5 meeting, Berry assured Agent 
Edwards that Washington was committed to the robbery plan.   
Trial counsel’s extensive cross-examination of Agent 
Bowman dealt in part with inconsistencies in the investigation 
and in ATF’s targeting of Washington.  Counsel also probed 
the racial dimensions of ATF sting operations; Bowman 
admitted that he had participated in three Philadelphia sting 
operations, all of which targeted only African American 
defendants. (A similar response had earlier been elicited from 
Agent Edwards, who admitted that perhaps two defendants in 
over 13 scenarios were not African American—and both of 
those were Latino.)   
Trouble arose when trial counsel began asking 
Bowman about Washington’s uneasy fit with the ATF 
targeting guidelines’ requirement of prior criminal histories.   
Q: All right. Now we know that you didn’t use – they 
didn’t have my client identified before he was arrested. 
You knew him as Ski, or some other name, right? 
A: Correct. 
Q: So you didn’t know if he had a prior criminal 
history, right? 
A: No, not during the investigation. 
Q: All right. And you found out after the arrest and 
some checking, you found out that my client doesn't 
have a history for robbery, right? 
A: (No verbal response) 
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Q: And he doesn’t have a history for drugs, does he? 
A: I don’t recall. 
Q: If he did, you would recall, sir, wouldn’t you? Isn’t 
that fair? 
A: I don’t want to misstate, but I’m pretty sure he had 
a -- 
Q: If you’re not sure, you probably shouldn’t say -- 
A: -- drug arrest.[37] 
Q: -- you probably shouldn’t say, you’re not sure. I’ve 
had his record, and I can say, I didn’t see a robbery 
conviction. 
A: I don’t think there’s a robbery conviction, no. 
Q: And I have his record, I didn’t see a drug 
conviction. 
A: I don’t recall.38 
                                              
37 Washington argues that the jury twice heard evidence of 
Washington’s criminal history, once on direct and once on 
rebuttal.  As the excerpt shows, however, the initial mention 
of Washington’s drug conviction was equivocal—“I’m pretty 
sure”—and broached in the context of an arrest, not a 
conviction.   
38 S.A. 176–77.   
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But Washington did have a drug conviction.  In fact, 
just a few days before Bowman took the stand, the 
government had filed its 21 U.S.C. § 851 information 
identifying a “prior felony controlled substance violation” 
that it intended to use “as the basis for increased punishment” 
in the event that Washington was convicted.39     
While Bowman had not directly confirmed 
Washington’s criminal history on cross, the prosecutor saw 
the door swing open and, on redirect, invited Agent Bowman 
to stroll through it: 
Q: [Trial counsel] asked you some questions about Mr. 
Washington’s criminal history. 
A: Yes. 
Q: You said you weren’t sure when he asked you 
specific questions about whether he had a drug 
conviction, whether he had a robbery conviction, 
whether he had a violent crime conviction. You said, I 
don’t recall -- 
. . . 
Q: You said you weren’t sure, correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: I want to take a moment and show you Government 
Exhibit 403, 404 and 405. That’s Government Exhibit 
403. Let’s move on to 404. And lastly, we move on to 
                                              
39 Section 851 Information, ECF No. 202. 
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Government Exhibit 405. Did you review those three 
exhibits? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And after reviewing them, are you sure whether or 
not Mr. Washington has a prior drug conviction? 
A: He does have a prior drug conviction.40 
After this exchange, the issue of Washington’s criminal 
history does not appear to have come up again during trial.  
Further, trial counsel did not request, and the District Court 
did not give, any limiting instruction.   
4. Strickland’s Prejudice Prong  
We may consider the two Strickland prongs in either 
order; and, as we have observed, it is “often practical to 
consider the prejudice prong first,”41 not the least because we 
“prefer[] to avoid passing judgment on counsel’s performance 
when possible.”42  Accordingly, we turn first to prejudice, 
which requires showing a “reasonable probability”—a 
“probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome”—that, “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, ‘the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.’”43   
                                              
40 June 8, 2015 Tr. at 99–100, ECF No. 245.   
41 United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 2015). 
42 United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2002). 
43 Vanterpool, 767 F.3d at 165 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694).   
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At the outset, we agree with the District Court that the 
evidence admitted at trial against Washington was daunting 
and, generally, damning.  His recorded statements alone, 
bluster or not, showed a willing and inquisitive member of the 
conspiracy.  On the day of the robbery itself, Washington 
appeared committed to its success.44  Washington attempts to 
push back on this reading of the record, but the big picture of 
the trial works against him.   
For instance, in support of his argument that the 
evidence was not actually “overwhelming,” he points out that 
the jury acquitted him of the count-five § 924(c) gun 
charge—which, unlike counts 1 through 4, was not a 
conspiracy or attempt charge.  This is true, but we struggle to 
assign it more than limited relevance.  The trial evidence 
showed that Berry, not Washington, hid the guns in the Eggo 
Waffles box, which he then handed to co-conspirator 
Johnson.  The guns were found in the minivan, not 
Washington’s Chrysler, when the caravan was taken down.  
Culpability arguably shifted away from Washington, and he 
has not satisfactorily shown how the jury’s apparent doubt 
with the firearm count is linked with the quantum of proof on 
the remaining counts of the indictment.  
Similarly, Washington points to two jury requests—
one to see the video of the takedown, and another regarding 
                                              
44 See Washington New Trial, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 153 
(recounting Washington’s concern, during the final pre-
robbery briefing, that co-conspirators Johnson and Ellis had 
purchased supplies from a grocery store, where the men could 
have been—and were—recorded on the store’s surveillance 
system). 
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the definition of entrapment or enticement—as indicative of 
its hesitance to convict.  The video was played back, and both 
the prosecution and defense agreed that entrapment was not at 
issue.  Beyond that, we do not think that the jury’s questions 
evince the kind of doubt that might meet Washington’s 
burden for showing prejudice.  If anything, all we can draw 
from the acquittal on this count is that the jury took seriously 
its duty to view the trial evidence on a count-by-count basis.45 
Washington also argues that the District Court erred by 
failing to separate the Hobbs Act robbery and drug counts in 
determining prejudice, contending the testimony about his 
drug conviction, and thus his propensity, affected the latter far 
more than the former.46  He emphasizes that the defense’s 
theory of the case rested in part on caution and lack of 
culpable intent, and points to selections of the recordings, 
admitted at trial, that show (or so he claims) that he was wary 
of cocaine and was not interested in dealing with it or 
                                              
45 In fact, the count-five acquittal strikes against 
Washington’s claim that the jury used his drug conviction 
against him on the grounds of predisposition.  Ample 
attention was drawn at trial to Washington’s alleged trigger-
happy statements, yet the jury was not convinced of 
Washington’s guilt on count five.  
46 While Washington’s PSR grouped the offenses for 
sentencing purposes, the District Court did not treat them as a 
single unit, imposing separate sentences on the robbery and 
drug counts of the indictment.  Accordingly, we assume 
without deciding that the counts are appropriately 
disaggregated for the purposes of Strickland prejudice.   
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otherwise becoming involved.  In one of these, Washington is 
recorded as saying that he “don’t fuck with coke.”47   
Even in light of the defense’s theory of the case, 
however, we do not agree that the charges can be so neatly 
separated.  Washington wants us to view the likelihood of 
prejudice from admitting the conviction as higher for the drug 
counts than the robbery counts.48  The fundamental flaw of 
Washington’s argument is that he never quite explains, in a 
way that satisfies his Strickland burden, why he would have 
participated in the robbery, or even in its planning stages, if 
not for the cocaine.  According to the testimony of ATF 
Agent Edwards, the “drug courier” told the other members of 
the conspiracy that no money would be found in the house.  
Even if Washington did not intend to personally handle the 
cocaine or move it for sale, he could not help but know that 
cocaine was the object of the robbery.  Viewed against this 
                                              
47 See, e.g., Washington Reply Br. at 7. 
48 While we assume without deciding that Washington could 
have prevailed on this theory, we note that a “caution” or 
“lack of total commitment” defense is difficult to successfully 
mount given the broad liability for drug-conspiracy charges.  
See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 425 
(3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“To prove a conspiracy, the 
government must show: (1) a shared unity of purpose; (2) an 
intent to achieve a common illegal goal; and (3) an agreement 
to work toward that goal.”); see also Smith v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 714, 719 (2013) (explaining withdrawal from a 
conspiracy); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) 
(holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a § 846 
conspiracy).  
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backdrop, the “I don’t fuck with coke” statement does not 
carry the expansive and exculpatory meaning that he would 
like to attribute to it.  Moreover, we agree with the 
government that the broader defense strategy of the case, 
which focused on showing that Washington lacked the violent 
criminal history required for ATF targeting, was not 
necessarily undermined by a fleeting mention of 
Washington’s prior drug conviction, especially in light of his 
apparent willingness to participate in the broader drug 
conspiracy.49   
We do not mean to trivialize the introduction into the 
case of Washington’s drug conviction; although we do not 
formally reach the Strickland performance prong, we struggle 
to perceive a strategic basis for opening the door.  
Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court that 
Washington has not met his burden, under Strickland, of 
showing that the mistake undermined confidence in the jury’s 
verdict.50  Accordingly, the ineffective assistance claim fails.  
                                              
49 The government notes that no additional details were given 
about the drug offense, so the jury did not know its nature or 
severity.  However, the jury could infer from the line of 
questioning that it was not a violent drug offense.  
50 Cf., e.g., Wilson v. Mazzuca, 570 F.3d 490, 502, 507 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (finding prejudice from admission of criminal 
history, in tandem with other errors, where the government 
presented a weak case in chief); Gilliam v. Sec’y for the Dep’t 
of Corr., 480 F.3d 1027, 1033–34 (11th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam) (finding no prejudice on § 2254(d) review when 
theory of defense was “sufficiently compromised by other 
evidence”); Lyons v. McCotter, 770 F.2d 529, 532 n.5 (5th 
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B.  Mandatory Minimum Due Process 
Challenge 
In challenging his 264-month sentence, Washington 
argues that the District Court erred in following the 20-year 
mandatory minimum term set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), 
which (as applicable here) kicks in when the quantity of 
cocaine is 5 kilograms or above and the defendant has a prior 
felony drug conviction.  He does not appear to disagree with 
the government that, in the ordinary course of things, the 
“mandatory” minimum is precisely what it says on the tin.51  
Nor does he argue that the facts supporting the mandatory 
minimum sentence—an indictment charging 5 kilograms or 
more of cocaine, a corresponding jury verdict, and a properly 
filed § 851 notice of a prior conviction—were absent or 
infirm.  Rather, he contends that its application in this kind of 
case, where the comprising elements were entirely fictitious 
and in the hands of the government, violates his right to due 
process.   
                                                                                                     
Cir. 1985) (“[W]e conclude that the prosecutor’s case was far 
from overwhelming and that the introduction into evidence of 
Lyons’ prior aggravated robbery conviction undermined the 
reliability of his present conviction.”).   
51 See, e.g., United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 392 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts are required to sentence 
defendants guilty of that crime to a term of imprisonment no 
less than the Congressionally prescribed minimum, unless an 
explicit exception to the minimum sentence applies.”).   
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1. Standard of Review 
We begin by noting that although Washington did 
object to the mandatory minimum at sentencing, he argued 
there on the basis of congressional intent, not due process.  
The due process argument also does not appear in his three 
sentencing memoranda.  While Washington’s failure to 
develop the constitutional basis for his objection might 
ordinarily limit the scope of our review, we retain discretion 
to reach unpreserved arguments in appropriate 
circumstances.52  Here, the government asks us to conduct de 
novo review and responds to Washington’s argument on the 
merits.  While a party’s concession does not control the 
exercise of our discretion, it is certainly a factor we may 
consider.  Hence, because Washington did raise an objection 
to the application of the mandatory minimum sentence, and 
the argument that he relied on came within a stone’s throw of 
the one he raises now, we will “waive the waiver” and 
consider Washington’s claim on the merits.53  As a 
                                              
52 See United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 
2013); cf. United States v. Archuleta, 412 F.3d 1003, 1007 
(8th Cir. 2005) (reviewing newly raised constitutional 
argument for plain error) 
53 See United States v. Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d 34, 54 (1st 
Cir. 2016) (declining to enforce forfeiture when the 
government addressed the merits of unpreserved Fifth 
Amendment argument); United States v. Pendleton, 832 F.3d 
934, 948 n.4 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Government does not 
assert forfeiture and instead argues for de novo review on the 
merits.  Thus, we choose to apply the usual standard for 
evaluating the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.”); see also 
United States v. Jones, 833 F.3d 341, 343 (3d Cir. 2016) 
 32 
 
constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum, it draws 
plenary review.54 
                                                                                                     
(“Because we would reach the same result under either 
standard of review, we will apply de novo review, which is 
more favorable to [the defendant].”).   
Our decision in United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 
2013), is not to the contrary.  Joseph “rectif[ied] 
imprecisions” in our preservation and waiver jurisprudence, 
and clarified too the oft-overlooked distinction between 
“issues” and “arguments,” at least as we use those terms in 
this Circuit.  Id. at 337, 341–42.  To the extent the specific 
waiver or forfeiture framework in Joseph applies outside of 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12, see id. at 338–39 nn.2–3, it does not limit 
our discretion to excuse waiver or forfeiture concerns as we 
do here, especially when the government or appellee 
overlooks or disregards waiver or forfeiture and instead asks 
for review of the merits.  See also Government’s Br. in 
United States v. Joseph, No. 12-3808, 2013 WL 1193044, at 
*16–20 (invoking waiver).  
54 United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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2. Outrageous Government 
Conduct and Sentencing 
Factor Manipulation55 
Washington’s due process challenge falls within the 
broader category of “outrageous government conduct”—that 
                                              
55 The government suggests in its brief that Washington’s 
sentencing challenge is foreclosed by a sentence above the 
mandatory minimum.  See Gov’t Br. at 57–58.  We disagree.  
The District Court was clearly guided by the mandatory 
minimum term on the drug counts in crafting the overall 
sentence.  As a result, Washington’s challenge remains viable 
despite a sentence above the bare minimum authorized by 
law.  Compare United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 
1001–02 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that, when the district court 
appeared to treat the mandatory minimum as the lower 
bracket for determining a below-Guidelines sentence, court 
could not say that the mandatory minimum had “absolutely 
no effect”), and United States v. Barnes, 769 F.3d 94, 98–99 
(1st Cir. 2014) (reaching the legality of a mandatory 
minimum sentence although the defendant’s net term was 10 
years above the minimum because of references throughout to 
the mandatory minimum), with United States v. Ramírez-
Negrón, 751 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding no due 
process error when a defendant’s sentence was based 
“entirely on Guidelines considerations”), and United States v. 
Ramos, 695 F.3d 1035, 1049 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding 
that a defendant lacked standing to challenge constitutionality 
of mandatory minimum because the “actual sentence of 
eighty-seven months was not affected by the statutorily 
prescribed mandatory minimum” but was instead based on 
“the § 3553(a) factors and the Guidelines”).   
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is, an allegation that the government’s conduct was so 
outrageous that due process and fundamental fairness cannot 
abide the defendant’s conviction.56  In our hallmark case on 
the doctrine, United States v. Twigg, we decided that a meth 
scheme that was substantially engineered by the 
government—agents supplied precursor chemicals (at a 
significant discount), glassware, and a rented farmhouse for a 
lab—displayed the requisite level of outrageousness.57   
Twigg led to the ultimate sanction: reversal of the defendant’s 
conviction.58   
But Twigg, decided in 1978, is apparently one of only 
“two reported court of appeals decisions . . . that have deemed 
the government’s conduct so outrageous as to violate due 
process.”59  We have found no occasion since Twigg in a 
published decision to reverse a conviction or invalidate an 
indictment on the theory that the government has strayed 
outside of the boundaries contemplated by due process.60  In 
United States v. Dennis, for instance, we refused to dismiss an 
indictment in a reverse sting case not dissimilar to the one 
                                              
56 See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
57 See id. at 375–76, 380–81. 
58 Id. at 381.    
59 United States v. Combs, 827 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2016).   
60 See United States v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801, 813 (3d Cir. 
2017) (citing Twigg for the proposition that “[t]his Court has 
granted relief on a claim of outrageous government 
misconduct only once”). 
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now at bar, while emphasizing the “exceedingly great” 
evidentiary burden placed on the challenging defendant.61   
While our Twigg decision recognized an outrageous 
government conduct claim in the context of an attack on an 
indictment—and, by extension, the fact of the judgment of 
conviction itself—other courts have applied similar reasoning 
to a narrower universe of sentencing-related claims, often 
under the label “sentencing factor manipulation”—although 
they have not done so consistently.62  The Eleventh Circuit 
described one model of sentencing factor manipulation in 
United States v. Ciszkowski: 
[S]entencing factor manipulation occurs when 
the government’s manipulation of a sting 
operation, even if insufficient to support a due 
process claim, requires that the manipulation be 
filtered out of the sentencing calculus.  
Outrageous government conduct would 
necessitate the reversal of a defendant’s 
conviction, while sentencing factor 
manipulation would simply reduce the sentence 
applied to his conduct.  . . . When a court filters 
the manipulation out of the sentencing calculus 
before applying a sentencing provision, no 
                                              
61 826 F.3d 683, 694–95 (3d Cir. 2016); see also United 
States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 435 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(recognizing that dismissal is warranted only in “extreme 
cases” (citation omitted)). 
62 See United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 229–31 (3d Cir. 
2010) (describing the variation across courts of appeals). 
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mandatory minimum would arise in the first 
place.63   
Our previous precedential opinions have declined to 
take a definitive stance on the viability of this doctrine in our 
Circuit.64  But even assuming without deciding that the 
generous Ciszkowski framing of sentencing factor 
manipulation should apply—requiring a lesser showing than 
an “outrageous conduct” claim, and allowing for a District 
Court to depart below the mandatory minimum range—we 
find that Washington has failed to demonstrate, on the facts of 
this case, that the mandatory minimum should be excised 
from the indictment.  
At bottom, Washington argues that the government 
was uniquely positioned to determine the salient facts of his 
offense, which he was powerless to refute.  Working through 
its undercover operative and informant, the ATF did indeed 
set the amount of the fictitious cocaine (10 kilograms) and 
                                              
63 United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 
2007); see also United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1, 
14 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Sentencing factor manipulation occurs 
where government agents have improperly enlarged the scope 
or scale of a crime.  . . . Where the government engages in 
such manipulation, we recognize the court’s power to impose 
a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum as an 
equitable remedy.” (internal alterations, quotation marks, and 
citations omitted)).  But see United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 
1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (observing that the Eleventh 
Circuit “has never reduced a sentence on the basis of 
sentencing factor manipulation”).  
64 See Sed, 601 F.3d at 229–31.   
 37 
 
played up the likelihood of resistance (thereby encouraging 
the conspirators to arm themselves).   
But even assuming some impropriety here on the part 
of the government, most of the factors it created for the crime, 
and which were within its unique control, were not the drivers 
of Washington’s actual sentence.  Agent Edwards told the 
conspirators that they would encounter resistance, so they 
brought guns—and, had Washington been convicted of the 
gun charge, he would have faced an additional mandatory 
consecutive term.65  But he was not.  Further, Agent Edwards 
told the conspirators that they could expect to recover 10 
kilograms of cocaine in the robbery, corresponding to 2014 
Guidelines base offense level of 30.66  However, because he 
was a career offender, Washington’s Guidelines range was 
not governed directly by the 10 kilogram drug-quantity 
amount—and the District Court sentenced him far below the 
recommended Guidelines range anyway.67   
Instead, the 20-year mandatory minimum was the 
product of two factors: the 5 kilograms of cocaine charged in 
the indictment and found by a jury, and the § 851 statement 
                                              
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).   
66 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5) (2014).   
67 To the extent the government manipulated factors that have 
not been shown to prejudice Washington, the weight of those 
factors is diminished.  Cf. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 
198 (3d Cir. 2000) (evaluating prosecutorial misconduct due 
process claim for presence of prejudice). 
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filed by the government.68  The latter, as the Supreme Court 
has indicated, is a matter of discretion “similar to the 
discretion a prosecutor exercises when he decides what, if 
any, charges to bring against a criminal suspect . . . and is 
appropriate, so long as it is not based upon improper 
factors.”69  Washington does not argue that the process 
envisioned by § 851 was not properly followed or was based 
on impermissible considerations.70  
                                              
68 The career offender Guideline itself is based on the offense 
statutory maximum—here, life in prison, with or without the 
§ 851 enhancement—so in that sense the Guidelines 
sentencing range was determined by a drug quantity.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (2014); 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A).  Again, 
though, the District Court did not sentence in accordance with 
that range, and—as we discuss infra—the 5 kilogram amount 
is far below what courts have approved in other cases.  
69 United States v. Labonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997); see 
also United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 671–72 (2d Cir. 
2008) (rejecting due process challenge when the government 
filed § 851 notice against one defendant, but not his 
codefendants).   
70 That is not to say that we affirmatively endorse the 
prosecution’s decision here, which has the unavoidable 
appearance of punishing Washington for exercising his right 
to go to trial.  But on these facts, this is not enough to declare 
the government’s actions beyond the pale or invidiously 
motivated, especially with the longstanding recognition—
both by us and by the Supreme Court—of the deference 
afforded to prosecutorial decisions.  For better or worse, 
prosecutors have a great deal of power to use specific 
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So it comes down, in the end, to the drug quantity.  We 
acknowledge Washington’s concerns, which are well stated 
and logical, that the drugs did not exist, and that his ironclad 
mandatory minimum has no real-world foundation.  Other 
courts of appeals, however, have roundly rejected claims that 
amounts greater than 5 kilograms, or even 10 kilograms, 
amount to sentencing factor manipulation.71  Further, Agent 
                                                                                                     
charging decisions to guide mandatory sentencing exposure.  
By way of example, a defendant in one recent New Jersey 
stash house case was charged in part with conspiring to 
possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of 
cocaine, exposing him to the mandatory minimum term.  
When the defendant agreed to plead guilty, the government 
filed a superseding information that simply deleted the drug 
quantity from the conspiracy charge, thereby eliminating the 
mandatory minimum.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press 
Release, Burlington County, New Jersey, Man Sentenced To 
Eight Years In Prison For Scheme To Rob Drug Dealers At 
Gunpoint, https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/burlington-
county-new-jersey-man-sentenced-eight-years-prison-
scheme-rob-drug-dealers (Feb. 8, 2017; archived at 
https://perma.cc/Y5XD-UULW); United States v. Forman, 
D.N.J. Crim. No. 1:14-cr-00152, ECF Nos. 27, 81.   
71 See United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 102–03 (4th Cir. 
2016) (collecting cases for the proposition that “15 to 20 
kilograms of cocaine” amounts to “considerably less than the 
quantity of cocaine at issue in other stash house sting cases”); 
United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 
1998) (“The fact that the government’s fictitious reverse sting 
operation involved a large quantity of drugs does not amount 
to the type of manipulative governmental conduct warranting 
a downward departure in sentencing.”).   
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Edwards testified at trial that the amount chosen for the sting 
was a “conservative” number based upon the drug weights 
found in “a typical [Philadelphia] stash house.”72  He 
explained that the proposed scenario “always has to be 
realistic” or it might be questioned by the robbery crews.73  
Washington has not offered anything to the contrary.  Put 
simply, there is not enough here for us to conclude that the 
                                              
72 June 3 Tr. at 84.   
73 June 3 Tr. at 85–86.  These statements were made in the 
context of Agent Edwards’s trial testimony, not at sentencing.  
It does not appear that the justifications for the amount 
chosen were re-raised at sentencing.  We acknowledge that 
Agent Edwards’s testimony indicates that all Philadelphia 
stash-house stings crafted in accordance with ATF 
methodology will involve, in some sense, an amount above 
the mandatory minimum threshold.  Insufficient evidence was 
presented to allow the determination of whether a lesser 
quantity, below the mandatory minimum amount, would have 
sufficed to entice a four-man crew.  See, e.g., June 3 Tr. at 
129 (testimony by Agent Edwards that his “courier” wanted 
only one to one and a half kilogram as a nonparticipant).  But 
see Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d at 15 (“Although it is certainly 
feasible that . . . the agents could have used some lesser 
quantity of drugs and still made the deals look realistic, the 
mere fact that they did not, without more, does not establish 
that the agents engaged in the kind of extraordinary 
misconduct . . . that is required of a successful sentencing 
manipulation claim.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).  A district court is, of course, free to probe this 
reasoning, especially if culpability or entrapment are raised as 
specific defenses.   
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government chose the 10 kilogram amount primarily, or even 
secondarily, “to inflate [Washington’s] sentence upon a 
conviction.”74   
Washington encourages us to follow the reasoning of 
United States v. McLean, in which a different judge in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced below the 
mandatory minimum, on due process grounds, in a reverse-
sting stash house case.75  McLean, which is nonbinding,76 is 
also distinguishable.  The defendant there received a “split” 
jury verdict on the amount of cocaine involved: 5 kilograms 
with regard to conspiracy but 500 grams with regard to 
attempt.77  We detect no equivalent ambiguity in the jury’s 
verdict on Washington’s ultimate culpability, and therefore 
reject this argument.78 
                                              
74 Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1271. 
75 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 942–45 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
76 The government sought to appeal the McLean sentence, but 
(as the government explained at oral argument) was unable to 
obtain the Solicitor General’s permission to pursue the 
appeal.  See C.A. No. 16-3227 (order dismissing appeal 
entered Sept. 15, 2016).  The defendant appealed the 
judgment of conviction, which we recently affirmed. See 
generally United States v. McLean, No. 16-2993, 2017 WL 
3309762 (3d Cir. Aug. 3, 2017) (nonprecedential).  
77 See McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 939–40 & n.13.   
78 We note that McLean contains an extensive recitation of the 
facts and factors that caused its district court to depart below 
the mandatory minimum.  While constitutional challenges to 
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In sum, we conclude that the 5 kilograms of cocaine 
charged in the indictment and found by the jury did not 
amount to an impermissible manipulation of sentencing 
factors by the government.  To the extent that the fictitious 10 
kilogram quantity is relevant, we find too that Washington 
has shown neither improper manipulation nor prejudice.  
Nevertheless, we remind the government that we have 
expressed misgivings in the past about the wisdom and 
viability of reverse stash house stings.  That this case fell on 
the safe side of the due process divide should not be taken to 
indicate that all such prosecutions will share the same fate.  
As one of our colleagues said in a prior case, “I do not find it 
impossible for the Government to exercise its discretion 
rationally to set up stash house reverse stings.  But I share the 
concern that this practice, if not properly checked, eventually 
will find itself on the wrong side of the line.”79   
C. Selective Enforcement Discovery Claim 
Finally, Washington appeals in part the denial of his 
pretrial motion for discovery, which he filed in order to 
“prepare a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of 
racial profiling and/or selective prosecution of racial 
minorities by the ATF Office in Philadelphia, in conjunction 
                                                                                                     
mandatory minimum sentences draw de novo review, it might 
be the case that a district court’s factfinding and underlying 
reasoning, as opposed to its application of a legal standard, 
may be due some level of deference.  We need not resolve the 
question in this appeal. 
79 See Dennis, 826 F.3d at 699 (Ambro, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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with the local U.S. Attorney’s Office.”80  He contends that the 
District Court erred in applying a strict discovery standard—
Armstrong/Bass—to the portions of his motion that pertained 
to law enforcement and ATF material on stash-house reverse 
stings, as opposed to those portions (the denial of which he 
does not appeal) that sought information related to the 
prosecution of those offenses.  Instead of employing 
Armstrong/Bass, Washington contends, we should follow the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Davis, which 
appeared to depart from the Armstrong/Bass model for claims 
of selective enforcement in stash house cases.   
While discovery rulings are ordinarily reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, “we exercise de novo review over the 
standards the district court used in exercising its discretion.”81  
And although we decline to adopt Davis wholesale, we 
                                              
80 Washington Discovery, 2014 WL 2959493, at *2.   
81 Redland Soccer Club v. Dep’t of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 
845 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 
81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its 
discretion when it makes an error of law.”), superseded by 
statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. 
Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 70 (1st Cir. 2004).  Although the 
government disputes whether Washington’s appellate claim 
matches what he raised below, its response brief generally 
answers on the merits; the procedural objection is to the scope 
of his request, not the consistency of his legal theory.  We are 
satisfied, from our review of the record, that Washington 
adequately developed the claim across his District Court 
submissions. 
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nevertheless agree with the Davis court that district judges 
have more flexibility, outside of the Armstrong/Bass 
framework, to permit and manage discovery on claims like 
Washington’s.  Accordingly, as explained further below, we 
will vacate the District Court’s discovery orders and issue a 
limited remand for further post-judgment proceedings.  
1.  Substantive Equal Protection 
Claims: “Clear Evidence” of 
Discriminatory Effect and 
Intent 
Washington’s argument rests on the distinction 
between “selective prosecution” and “selective enforcement,” 
labels that we (and others) sometimes deploy 
interchangeably.  Here, we use them as Washington does.  
“Prosecution” refers to the actions of prosecutors (in their 
capacity as prosecutors) and “enforcement” to the actions of 
law enforcement and those affiliated with law-enforcement 
personnel.  
We start with a point of commonality.  Substantive 
claims of selective prosecution and selective enforcement are 
generally evaluated under the same two-part test, which is 
derived from a line of seminal Supreme Court cases about the 
collision between equal protection principles and the criminal 
justice system.82  A defendant challenging a criminal 
prosecution at either the law enforcement or prosecution 
                                              
82 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) 
(“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the 
law based on considerations such as race.”); Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).  
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inflection points must provide “clear evidence” of 
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent (the latter is 
sometimes referred to as “discriminatory purpose”).83  
Meeting this standard generally requires evidence that 
similarly situated individuals of a difference race or 
classification were not prosecuted, arrested, or otherwise 
investigated.84   
                                              
83 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 197 (3d 
Cir. 2012); Harajli v. Huron Twp., 365 F.3d 501, 508 (6th 
Cir. 2004); United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d 
Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Whitfield, 649 F. App’x 
192, 196 n.11 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (“[T]he prima 
facie elements for both selective prosecution and selective 
enforcement are the same: discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory intent.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1063 (2017); 
Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 920 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(discussing a civil selective enforcement claim); Hill v. City 
of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); 
Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1168 
(10th Cir. 2003) (“These standards have been applied to 
traffic stops challenged on equal protection grounds.”).  We 
cite Whitfield for its description of the law in our Circuit and 
do not assign it the weight of precedent. 
84 See United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 98–99 (4th Cir. 
2016); United States v. Brantley, 803 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th 
Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 
2003) (“When the claim is selective enforcement of the traffic 
laws or a racially-motivated arrest, the plaintiff must normally 
prove that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or 
arrested in order to show the requisite discriminatory effect 
 46 
 
2.  Armstrong/Bass: “Some Evidence” 
A criminal defendant, however, will not often have 
access to the information, statistical or otherwise, that might 
satisfy a “clear evidence” burden.  Thus, the two component 
cases that make up the Armstrong/Bass test—United States v. 
Armstrong85 and United States v. Bass86, both of which arose 
from selective prosecution challenges—propounded a facially 
less rigorous standard for criminal defendants seeking 
discovery on an anticipated selective prosecution claim.  
Instead of “clear evidence,” a successful discovery motion 
can rest on “some evidence.”87  “Some evidence” must still 
include a showing that similarly situated persons were not 
prosecuted.88  Furthermore, under Armstrong/Bass, the 
                                                                                                     
and purpose.”); see also Gov’t of V.I. v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 
34, 36 (3d Cir. 1986). 
85 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
86 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam). 
87 See Bass, 536 U.S. at 863 (“[A] defendant who seeks 
discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must show 
some evidence of both discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory intent.”); see also United States v. Arenas-
Ortiz, 339 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The showing 
necessary to obtain discovery is somewhat less” than 
prevailing on the merits).   
88 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469; Bass, 536 U.S. at 864 (“Under 
Armstrong, therefore, because respondent failed to submit 
relevant evidence that similarly situated persons were treated 
differently, he was not entitled to discovery.”).   
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defendant’s showing must be “credible” and cannot generally 
be satisfied with nationwide statistics.89     
Armstrong/Bass has proven to be a demanding 
gatekeeper.  In developing it, the Supreme Court sought to 
“balance[] the Government’s interest in vigorous prosecution 
and the defendant’s interest in avoiding selective prosecution” 
by creating a standard that, while difficult to meet, derived 
from “ordinary equal protection standards” and was not 
“insuperable.”90  The lived experience, however, has 
resembled less a challenge and more a rout, as practical and 
logistical hurdles abound—especially to proving a negative.91  
                                              
89 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470; United States v. Thorpe, 
471 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. 
Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 607–08 & n.24. (3d Cir. 2004) 
(rejecting under Armstrong/Bass a selective prosecution 
discovery request premised on “numerous newspaper 
articles” showing rampant cheating on the Test of English as 
a Foreign Language exam; “[t]he defect in Al Hedaithy’s 
proffer is that none of this evidence indicates that similarly 
situated persons were treated differently.  Demonstrating that 
thousands of other people have also cheated on the [] exam 
does nothing to identify persons who are similarly situated”). 
90 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, 470.   
91 See, e.g., Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real 
World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 827, 828–29, 846–47 (2003) 
(discussing, among other things, the problems with the 
“similarly situated” discovery standard, including the 
possibility that the “data . . . may simply not exist” or is in 
“the exclusive control of the government”); Richard H. 
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The government itself concedes that “neither the Supreme 
Court nor this Court has ever found sufficient evidence to 
permit discovery of a prosecutor’s decision-making policies 
and practices.”92   
So, too, in Washington’s case, as the District Court 
here found that his discovery motion had fallen short of 
Armstrong/Bass.  His list of three prior stash house cases, the 
District Court determined, revealed nothing about similarly 
situated individuals who were not ensnared in stash-house 
stings, and Washington had otherwise not shown 
discriminatory intent/purpose.93   
3.  Armstrong/Bass in “Selective 
Enforcement” Cases 
On appeal, Washington does not argue that the District 
Court’s Armstrong/Bass analysis was wrong, but rather that 
                                                                                                     
McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the 
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 605, 640 (1998) 
(“The Armstrong holding and the implications of its 
reasoning create a barrier to discovery that, for the great 
majority of criminal cases, is insuperable.”); Thorpe, 471 
F.3d at 663; see also Whitfield, 649 F. App’x at 196 n.11; 
Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, 1139 
(2000) (“The bar for selective enforcement and prosecution 
claims has been set at a nearly unreachable height for the vast 
majority of criminal defendants, an example of an abstract 
right with no practical remedy.”).   
92 Gov’t Br. at 31. 
93 Washington Discovery, 2014 WL 2959493, at *7. 
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Armstrong/Bass—which arose from discovery aimed at 
claims of selective prosecution, not selective enforcement—
should not have applied at all to the subset of his claims 
seeking law-enforcement evidence.  “The sort of 
considerations that led to the outcome in Armstrong,” he 
contends, “do not apply to . . . ATF agents engaged in racial 
discrimination when selecting targets for sting operations, or 
when deciding which suspects to refer for prosecution.”94  
Washington also points to the difficulty of obtaining pre-
discovery statistics in selective prosecution cases, arguing 
that requiring the same in law-enforcement cases—when 
there are likely to be no records of similarly situated 
individuals who were not arrested or investigated—would 
transform the functional impossibility of Armstrong/Bass into 
a complete impossibility.95  While substantive selective 
prosecution and enforcement cases must ultimately reach the 
same destination—“clear evidence” of discriminatory 
purpose/intent and effect—Washington suggests that 
enforcement cases, which do not implicate the heightened 
protections afforded to prosecution decisions, should be 
permitted to travel on a less rocky path.  
We have not previously addressed this particular 
prosecution/enforcement distinction in a precedential 
decision.96  And it is true that Armstrong and Bass, both of 
                                              
94 Washington Br. at 19.   
95 See id. (citing Hare, 820 F.3d at 100).   
96 See Whitfield, 649 F. App’x at 196 n.11.  The government 
says that we have been “reluctant to permit discovery into the 
government’s investigatory and prosecutorial practices 
without a substantial showing by the defendant.”  Gov’t Br. at 
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which arose from selective prosecution claims, were 
grounded in part on the special solicitude courts have shown 
to prosecutors’ discretion.  For instance, the Armstrong Court 
said that a “selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the 
merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent 
assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for 
reasons forbidden by the Constitution,” and because of the 
great deference owed to prosecutorial decision-making, the 
Court was reluctant to abrogate the “background 
presumption” that “the showing necessary to obtain discovery 
should itself be a significant barrier to the litigation of 
insubstantial claims.”97   
Other courts of appeals, however, have extended the 
reasoning of Armstrong/Bass to claims of selective 
enforcement and have applied the same burden (“some 
evidence”) to the related discovery requests.  The Fourth and 
Tenth Circuits are two,98 and until recently the Seventh 
                                                                                                     
31.  While that is true, the two cases the government cites—
Al Hedaithy and United States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206 
(3d Cir. 1998)—discussed prosecutorial decision-making, 
such as the (nonconstitutional) challenge to substantial 
assistance motions in Abuhouran, see 161 F.3d at 216.  They 
do not provide a definitive answer to the question here: 
whether we may look behind the law-enforcement curtain.    
97 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463–64 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).   
98 See United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1264 
(10th Cir. 2006) (“[Armstrong’s] elements are essentially the 
same for a selective-enforcement claim.”); United States v. 
Mason, 774 F.3d 824, 829–30 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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Circuit appeared to be another.  In United States v. Barlow, 
the Seventh Circuit addressed a discovery claim based on 
racial profiling, a “selective law enforcement tactic.”99  In 
deciding that the District Court had not abused its discretion 
in denying discovery, the Barlow court followed Armstrong 
(Bass had not yet been issued), finding that defendant Barlow 
had not presented relevant and reliable data on the “similarly 
situated” prong of the test.100   
4. The Seventh Circuit’s Davis 
Decision 
But in United States v. Davis,101 the en banc Seventh 
Circuit appeared to narrow the scope of Armstrong/Bass.  
Davis was an appeal from a pretrial order granting discovery 
in a stash-house reverse-sting case.102  The defendants had 
alleged that the prosecutor, FBI, and ATF had engaged in 
racial discrimination, pointing to some discomfiting statistics: 
out of 94 defendants across 20 Northern District of Illinois 
stash-house sting prosecutions, only six were non-Hispanic 
                                              
99 310 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002). 
100 See id. at 1010–11. 
101 793 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015). 
102 We need not address Davis’s procedural intrigue, although 
we note that it marked the dividing line between the en banc 
majority and dissent.  See Davis, 793 F.3d at 723 (Rovner, J., 
joined by Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“For all of the prudential 
reasons that we do not permit civil litigants to manufacture 
appellate jurisdiction, we should not allow an appeal based on 
the sort of non-final dismissal that was fabricated here.”).   
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whites.103  The statistics, however, revealed nothing about 
similarly situated persons who were not prosecuted.104  
Nevertheless, the district court granted a broad discovery 
order, reasoning in part that the “overwhelming majority” of 
those prosecuted being persons of color met, by inference, the 
defendants’ burden under Armstrong/Bass.105   
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the government that 
the district court’s reasoning was inconsistent with 
Armstrong.  If Armstrong’s record, which showed the 
exclusive prosecution of African Americans for crack 
offenses, was not sufficient, then a showing that “three-
quarters of the defendants in stash-house cases have been 
black does not suffice.”106   
The Seventh Circuit then addressed whether 
Armstrong/Bass was the relevant test at all.  In this Circuit’s 
view, the key distinction lay between prosecutors, who are 
“protected by a powerful privilege or covered by a 
presumption of constitutional behavior” recognized by 
Armstrong, and FBI/ATF agents, who “regularly testify in 
criminal cases” and whose “credibility may be relentlessly 
attacked by defense counsel.”107  For these and other reasons, 
the Seventh Circuit decided that “the sort of considerations 
                                              
103 Davis, 793 F.3d at 714–15.   
104 See id. at 715.   
105 See Order at 2, United States v. Davis, N.D. Il. Crim. No. 
13-cr-63-2 (order entered October 30, 2013).   
106 Davis, 793 F.3d at 719–20.   
107 Id. at 720.   
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that led to the outcome in Armstrong do not apply to a 
contention that agents of the FBI or ATF engaged in racial 
discrimination when selecting targets for sting operations, or 
when deciding which suspects to refer for prosecution.”108   
Having ruled that Armstrong/Bass did not quite govern 
the law-enforcement aspects of the defendants’ discovery 
request, the Seventh Circuit decided that the District Court’s 
comprehensive discovery order was nonetheless an abuse of 
discretion.  Sweeping and overbroad, the order engulfed too 
much that did implicate prosecutorial discretion and was not 
tailored to the boundaries of the case nor the scope of the 
defendants’ proffer.109   
On remand, instead of issuing a “blunderbuss order,” 
the district court was ordered to take “measured steps” to 
determine the scope and boundaries of discovery.110  First, the 
district court was to determine whether there was reason to 
believe that race played a role in the investigation—that 
“forbidden selectivity occurred or plausibly could have 
occurred”111—by evaluating the evidence already of record, 
new evidence acquired by the defendants, and (if necessary) 
the affidavits and limited testimony of case agents.  If the 
inquiry gave the district court reason to believe that similarly 
situated persons would not have been pursued by law 
enforcement, in camera disclosure of targeting criteria might 
                                              
108 Id. at 721.   
109 See id. at 722.   
110 Id.   
111 Id. at 723.  
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be called for.  If the trail of breadcrumbs continued, 
additional targeted inquiries might be justified; and if the 
obtained information crossed the Armstrong/Bass threshold, 
the discovery could be “extended to the prosecutor’s 
office.”112   
                                              
112 Id. at 722–23.  Although it is of limited relevance to the 
actual legal issue on appeal, the “switch” in Davis arose after 
years of unease in Seventh Circuit district courts—and in the 
Northern District of Illinois in particular—about reverse sting 
cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Paxton, No. 13 CR 103, 
2014 WL 1648746, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2014) (granting 
discovery under Armstrong/Bass, in part because “no white 
defendants have been indicted for phony stash house cases 
since 2009, despite the diverse makeup of the Northern 
District of Illinois”).  Post-Davis, the controversy continues.  
See Jason Meisner & Annie Sweeney, Lawyers: ATF Stings 
Racially Biased; U. of C.-led Team says Stash House Cases 
Show Feds Unfairly Targeted Minorities, Chi. Trib., Mar. 5, 
2017, at C1, available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-atf-
stash-house-sting-racial-discrimination-met-20170303-
story.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2017; archived at 
https://perma.cc/XY4G-MKYG).  A report in one pending 
case, prepared by Columbia Law professor Jeffrey Fagan, 
concludes among other things that “race remains a 
statistically significant predictor of selection as a Stash House 
defendant.”  See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, United States v. 
Alfred Washington, N.D. Il. Crim. No. 12-CR-632, ECF No. 
510-2. 
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5.  Davis’s Application to 
Washington’s Claims 
In sum, despite not being a straightforward affirmance 
of a pro-defendant discovery decision, Davis does more or 
less what Washington would like this Court to do: find 
Armstrong/Bass inapplicable in part and send the case back to 
the District Court to make additional inquiries—bolstered, 
perhaps, by whatever evidence has become available since.   
However, there are good reasons to be cautious about 
Davis, and its practical application in this case is not quite as 
straightforward as Washington suggests.  While the Seventh 
Circuit did not follow Armstrong/Bass, Davis does not clearly 
state whether the test adopted in its stead was a variation of 
Armstrong/Bass or, alternatively, was intended to be a 
complete departure.  For instance, Davis does not explicitly 
discuss the discriminatory purpose/intent prong of the 
traditional Armstrong/Bass analysis.113  Davis might therefore 
be fairly described as an opinion entirely about discriminatory 
effect as a gateway to discovery.  Moreover, Davis does not 
mention the Seventh Circuit’s earlier decision in Barlow at 
all—not to harmonize it, distinguish it, or explicitly overrule 
it.114  Davis also arose on a different posture, where the 
                                              
113 It is perhaps true that, in a given investigation, a finding 
that a defendant would not have been prosecuted if he had 
been non-Hispanic white is enough to suggest an inference of 
discriminatory purpose/intent.   
114 At least one court has observed this ambiguity in the 
Seventh Circuit’s case law in declining to adopt the 
prosecution/enforcement discovery dichotomy.  See United 
States v. Lamar, No. 14 CR 726, 2015 WL 4720282, at *5 n.3 
 56 
 
defendant had prevailed below and, thus, benefitted from 
partial appellate deference to the trial court’s exercise of 
discretion.  Here, by contrast, the District Court’s decision 
was not favorable to Washington; this Court’s deference thus 
tips the other way.  The Davis framework was further 
influenced by the Seventh Circuit’s review of a pretrial 
decision, as indicated by the court’s repeated references to 
expediency—“limited inquiries that can be conducted in a 
few weeks” so as to not “sidetrack[]” the case.115  While any 
framework must be mindful of the pretrial context in which 
discovery motions will be filed and decided, we are reviewing 
a final judgment, one which (as discussed further below) is 
not unwound if we decide to remand.   
6.  Strict Application of Armstrong/Bass 
is Inappropriate 
Despite our caution, we find ourselves in agreement 
with the core rationale of Davis: the special solicitude shown 
to prosecutorial discretion, which animated the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Armstrong and Bass—and our own 
reasoning in our pre-Armstrong/Bass case law on the same 
subject116—does not inevitably flow to the actions of law 
                                                                                                     
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015).  The government, for its part, 
argues that Davis is wrongly decided, and points in particular 
to the Barlow that did not bark.  See Gov’t Br. at 39 n.13.  
115 Davis, 793 F.3d at 723.   
116 See, e.g., United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569–70 
(3d Cir. 1979) (discussing the need to “minimize the intrusion 
on the prosecutorial function” in the context of the burden 
required to obtain an evidentiary hearing); see also In re 
Grand Jury, 619 F.2d 1022, 1030 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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enforcement, or even to prosecutors acting in an investigative 
capacity.  Prosecutors are ordinarily shielded by absolute 
immunity for their prosecutorial acts,117 but police officers 
and federal agents enjoy no such categorical protection.118  
And, as the Davis court observed, officers and agents are 
expected to testify in criminal cases, with their honesty and 
candor “open to challenge.”119  That aspects of law 
enforcement and prosecutorial discretion are often 
intertwined does not make the distinction between the two 
realms any less legitimate; courts are often called upon to 
determine whether specific acts fall more into one category 
than the other.120   
                                              
117 See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–71 
(1993); Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2008). 
118 See Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 
1995); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1216 (3d Cir. 
1979) (“[F]ederal law enforcement officers are entitled only 
to qualified, or good faith, immunity.”).   
119 Davis, 793 F.3d at 720.   
120 The government suggests that when a district court is 
presented with mixed claims, or some selective enforcement 
and some selective prosecution claims, applying the 
Armstrong/Bass standard across the board is appropriate.  
Gov’t Br. at 28.  This contention was rejected by Davis, 793 
F.3d at 723 (observing that, if the “measured steps” discovery 
rises to the level required by Armstrong/Bass, the 
investigation can “extend[] to the prosecutor’s office”), and 
we agree that it unduly penalizes a defendant who casts a 
wide net.  That said, it remains within the discretion of a 
district court—and, indeed, remains within the discretion of 
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A challenge to a law-enforcement policy also 
implicates another area where immunity is limited.  The ATF 
reverse sting model is familiar to us and other courts precisely 
because it is a defined operation, one with policies, manuals, 
targeting criteria, and standards.  Its appearance from coast to 
coast is not some kind of convergent law-enforcement 
evolution, but instead is due to the promulgation of official 
policies by a federal agency.  Claims of unconstitutional 
policies or practices, lodged against entities rather than 
individuals, often cannot be met with qualified or good-faith 
immunity defenses at all.121   
In sum, while we do not lightly depart from the well-
established Armstrong/Bass framework, the enforce-
ment/prosecution distinction is a legitimate one, and we 
therefore join the Davis court in finding Armstrong/Bass to be 
distinguishable on these facts.  Accordingly, motions for 
discovery seeking information on putative claims of 
unconstitutional selective enforcement are not governed by 
strict application of the Armstrong/Bass framework.   
Nevertheless, and as tacitly acknowledged by the 
Seventh Circuit, courts contemplating motions for discovery 
                                                                                                     
this District Court—to determine that a “selective 
enforcement” claim was either not appropriately raised or was 
simply a prosecution claim tailored to avoid the requirements 
of Armstrong/Bass.  As always, a court must look beyond the 
labels affixed by the party and focus on the substance of what 
is sought.  
121 See Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 102–04 (3d Cir. 
1996) (citing, among other things, Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)).   
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on selective enforcement claims must still be guided by the 
spirit of Armstrong/Bass, which incorporates the demands 
placed on the underlying substantive claims: not just “some 
evidence,” but the heightened “clear evidence” standard.  
Further, while we agree with a general approach of taking 
“measured steps” over the course of discovery, we decline to 
mandate a precise system or order that a district court must 
follow.  As we have often said, matters of docket control and 
discovery are committed to broad discretion of the district 
court.122  We are confident in the ability of district courts to 
react to the particular circumstances of a case—the likelihood 
of a near-term trial date, the complexity of the underlying 
matter, the strength of a defendant’s discovery proffer, the 
similarity to previous cases raising similar concerns, the need 
to avoid overly prejudicial or irrelevant disclosure, and so 
on—in crafting a measured approach to discovery.  Finally, 
we note that although we are now in a post-trial posture, the 
fact of the matter is that most, if not all, appeals from criminal 
discovery orders will be properly brought only after judgment 
is entered.123 
                                              
122 See, e.g., Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 734 
(3d Cir. 1995); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 
810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Newman, 476 F.2d 
733, 739 (3d Cir. 1973) (referring to criminal discovery 
rulings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16).   
123 See United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 627–28 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
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7.  Selective Enforcement Discovery 
Standard  
We therefore hold as follows.  In ruling on a pretrial 
discovery request that alleges selective prosecution and/or 
selective enforcement, a district court applies Armstrong/Bass 
to claims that implicate protected prosecutorial functions, 
such as those that arose in the namesake cases.  If claims of 
selective law enforcement are raised, or there are “mixed” 
claims that involve prosecutors acting in investigative or 
other capacities (in short, performing functions that ordinarily 
would not draw absolute immunity), the standard guiding the 
district court’s discretion is different.  While Armstrong/Bass 
remains the lodestar, a district court retains the discretion to 
conduct a limited pretrial inquiry into the challenged law-
enforcement practice on a proffer that shows “some 
evidence” of discriminatory effect.  The proffer must contain 
reliable statistical evidence, or its equivalent, and may be 
based in part on patterns of prosecutorial decisions (as was 
the case in Davis) even if the underlying challenge is to law 
enforcement decisions.124  Distinct from what is required 
under Armstrong/Bass, a defendant need not, at the initial 
                                              
124 We do not reach the question of the geographical 
boundaries of the initial evidence the defendant must 
provide—whether, in other words, the application of a law 
enforcement policy or practice in the defendant’s specific 
district might be contextualized by its application elsewhere, 
so long as the defendant adequately connects the practice 
elsewhere to his or her situation.  We leave this issue to the 
district court’s discretion and common sense, in light of the 
need to show that the policy ultimately acted upon, or did not 
act upon, persons similarly situated to the defendant.  
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stage, provide “some evidence” of discriminatory intent, or 
show that (on the effect prong) similarly situated persons of a 
different race or equal protection classification were not 
arrested or investigated by law enforcement.  However, the 
proffer must be strong enough to support a reasonable 
inference of discriminatory intent and non-enforcement.  
If a district court finds that the above has been met, it 
may conduct limited inquiries of the sort recommended in 
Davis, and cabined to the same considerations of judicial 
economy and the need to avoid protracted pretrial litigation of 
matters collateral to the upcoming trial—as well as the need 
to avoid impinging on other areas of executive privilege.  
Areas of consideration could include the testimony, in person 
or otherwise, of case agents or supervisors, and the in camera 
analysis of policy statements, manuals, or other agency 
documents.  Relevant information, having passed the filter, 
can also be disclosed to the defendant, although the district 
court retains discretion to forgo disclosure of or otherwise 
restrict the use of information that, while relevant to a 
selective enforcement claim, might not ordinarily be the sort 
of discovery material available to a criminal defendant under 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 or Brady and its progeny. 
Throughout, the district court must be mindful that the 
end “goal” of such a discovery motion is a valid claim of 
selective enforcement under the heightened substantive 
standards, which we are not asked to diminish or distinguish.  
If the district court’s initial or secondary inquiry sees that 
destination recede or stand still, not advance, the court 
operates within its discretion to deny additional discovery and 
to proceed to trial.  
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That limited discovery of this sort may be granted in 
one case does not guarantee—and should not guarantee—that 
it will be granted in another, similar case, even within the 
same district.125  But courts may, of course, consider the 
product of earlier investigations in deciding whether to 
conduct pretrial discovery on the individual claims they 
happen to confront. 
8.  Remand is Necessary for the 
District Court to Exercise its 
Discretion under the Correct 
Framework 
Having set forth the governing standard for selective 
enforcement cases, we address its application to 
Washington’s case.  It is clear that the District Court thought 
itself bound by the more-demanding Armstrong/Bass standard 
across the entirety of Washington’s discovery request, and 
then again on reconsideration.  Because it exercised its 
discretion under the incorrect standard, we would normally 
remand for the District Court to reconsider its ruling in light 
of its now-enhanced discretion.  The government, however, 
advances two primary reasons why, in its view, remand is 
unnecessary. 
First, the government emphasizes that it “did not 
actually select or target any of the defendants,” suggesting 
that a selective enforcement claim is categorically 
                                              
125 See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 
1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]here is no such thing as ‘the 
law of the district.’”).   
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forestalled.126  This argument was raised in and rejected by 
Davis.  We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, although 
Berry “himself initiated matters by [asking] the informant for 
robbery opportunities and then chose his own comrades . . .[,] 
it remains possible that the [government] would not have 
pursued the investigation had [the crew] been white.”127   
Second, the government argues in essence that the 
matter need not be remanded because any error was harmless; 
Washington received everything to which he was entitled 
when the District Court gave him a redacted portion of an 
ATF manual on the eve of trial.  The Fourth Circuit took such 
an approach in United States v. Hare, decided shortly after 
Davis.  Despite quoting Davis with approval and exhibiting 
some discomfort with the Armstrong/Bass test as applied to 
stash-house cases, the Fourth Circuit decided that the 
defendants “ha[d] not shown that they are entitled to 
discovery beyond what the government has already 
produced.”128  While Washington also has not shown that he 
is “entitled” to anything beyond what he has already received, 
we think that the District Court, not our Court, is better 
positioned to make that determination.129   
                                              
126 Gov’t Br. at 35 n.10.   
127 Davis, 793 F.3d at 722–23.   
128 820 F.3d 93, 101 (4th Cir. 2016).   
129 Further, we note that 1) the District Court copied the 
approach taken in the Alexander Northern District of Illinois 
case, and thus may not have been independently exercising its 
discretion; and 2) material relevant to a trial defense does not 
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Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
discovery orders and remand for a renewed decision under the 
framework we articulate today.  We emphasize that we are 
not directing the District Court to grant discovery; our 
collective thumbs are not on the scale.  Rather, we commit the 
inquiry to the District Court’s considerable discretion.  We 
note that the District Court may, if it so chooses, consider 
additional information offered by Washington on remand as 
part of his proffer, as well as any relevant information (such 
as testimony about the racial cast of prior prosecutions) that 
was disclosed at trial.  
Two administrative considerations require additional 
attention.  First, as indicated by the Supreme Court in 
Armstrong itself, discovery requests like Washington’s exist 
outside of the framework of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, and are 
neither a challenge to nor a defense against the government’s 
actual case.130  It is well established, moreover, that both 
discovery orders and substantive equal protection challenges 
are appealable only after entry of final judgment.131  
                                                                                                     
necessarily coincide with what is relevant to a challenge to an 
indictment on equal protection grounds. 
130 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463–64.   
131 See Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 
Adapt of Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d 353, 360 (3d 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Howard, 867 F.2d 548, 552 (9th 
Cir. 1989); cf. United States v. Zone, 403 F.3d 1101, 1106–07 
(9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (merging discovery and 
substantive inquiry when underlying Double Jeopardy claim 
would have been appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine).   
 65 
 
Accordingly, by remanding for partial reconsideration of 
Washington’s discovery request, we do not unwind his 
conviction or otherwise undermine the jury’s verdict.  If 
discovery is granted, and if it leads to a successful selective 
enforcement claim, then his constitutional rights can be 
vindicated at that time by striking the indictment in whole or 
in part.132  Second, Washington did not file a motion to 
dismiss the indictment pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b), as 
his gateway discovery request was denied.  Despite the 
requirement in Rule 12(b)(3) that certain motions be made 
“before trial,” we will not require defendants to file quixotic 
substantive motions even before their predicate discovery 
motions are granted or denied.  In any event, we note that as 
of the 2014 revision to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3), the 
language of the rule makes clear that the substantive motion 
must be made pretrial only if “the basis for the motion is then 
reasonably available.” 
III.  CONCLUSION 
  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court, vacate the discovery orders, and remand 
for further proceedings.   
                                              
132 See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 978 & n.8 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (remanding for discovery on a selective 
prosecution claim, while noting that the remand “does not 
warrant a new trial, but only gives [the defendant] the 
opportunity to move to dismiss the indictment following 
discovery”); cf. United States v. Brizendine, 659 F.2d 215, 
222 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining how the court can “provide 
effective relief” on appeal from final judgment).   
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United States v. Washington, 16-2795 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
  
I agree with the Majority’s thoughtful and persuasive 
discussion of the discovery and ineffective counsel issues this 
case presents.  I therefore join Part II.A and Part II.C of the 
Majority Opinion.  However, I disagree with my colleagues’ 
rejection of Washington’s sentencing manipulation claim and 
his assertion that the mandatory minimum sentence should not 
apply in these unique circumstances.  Accordingly, I must 
respectfully dissent from Part II.B. 
 
I. Stash-House Sting Operations 
  
Arguably, undercover sting operations, including ones 
involving fictitious stash houses, can be a valuable 
investigative tactic for ferreting out those individuals who 
would otherwise commit crimes in their communities.  I also 
agree that “[c]ourts should go very slowly before staking out 
rules that will deter government agents from the proper 
performance of their investigative duties.”1  
  
However, the potential for abuse and mischief that is 
endemic to fictitious stash-house stings should not be ignored.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cautioned 
that stash-house stings “appear[] highly susceptible to abuse.”2  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is “wary of [stash-
house] operations” due to the “the ease with which the 
government can manipulate . . . factors [like drug 
quantities][.]”3  The Ninth Circuit specifically warned that one 
of the problems with such operations is that they ignore 
questions about whether a planned stash-house robbery is 
within a defendant’s actual “ambition and means.”4  Indeed, 
                                                          
1 United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(citation omitted).   
2 United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 103–04 (4th Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 224 (2016), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 
460 (2016).  
3 United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2010).  
4 Id.  
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my colleagues also express reservations about these operations 
here, even though they ultimately conclude that Washington is 
not entitled to relief.  Moreover, federal courts have noted that 
such sting operations risk opening the door to the very kind of 
racial profiling Washington is alleging here.5  All of these 
problems with stash-house operations have led noted jurist 
Richard Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
to conclude, on the whole, that such operations are “a 
disreputable tactic.”6  
  
The facts of this case illustrate that these cautions and 
misgivings are well-founded.  This investigation began with a 
confidential informant (“Roc”) advising a supervising ATF 
agent that he knew of an individual (Dwight Berry) who 
wanted to rob a drug stash house.  After Berry was identified, 
the ATF embarked upon inventing a scenario that would 
include weapons, a “crew,” and a mythical quantity of cocaine 
that would be the bait for those who would become ensnared 
in ATF’s trap.   
                                                          
5 In 2013, for example, Chief Judge Ruben Castillo of the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
ordered the disclosure of prosecutorial records after defense 
attorneys filed for discovery.  The defense attorneys argued 
that since 2011, all of the stash-house targets charged in 
Chicago’s federal courts had been minorities—19 African-
American and seven Latino defendants.  Chief Judge Castillo 
ordered discovery “on the sensitive issue of potential racial 
profiling” after concluding that “the defendants ha[d] made a 
strong showing of potential bias in the history of the 
prosecution of . . . ‘phony drug stash house rip off cases.’”  
Order, United States v. Brown, No. 12-cr-632, ECF No. 153, 
at 1 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2013).  Other district courts also have 
ordered discovery into the basis for ATF and federal 
prosecutors identifying suspects for investigation.  See Maj. 
Op. at 54 n.112.   
6 See, e.g., United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 414 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing that “[l]aw 
enforcement uses [such stings] to increase the amount of 
drugs that can be attributed to the persons stung, so as to jack 
up their sentences”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated 
(Jan. 16, 2013), on reh’g en banc sub nom. United States v. 
Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014).  
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It was the Government, not Berry, that selected 
cocaine—instead of, for example, marijuana—as the drug of 
choice for the stash house.  Although no cocaine actually 
existed, the Government decided to entice targeted individuals 
with a predetermined quantity of cocaine—10 kilograms—
which was double the amount needed to statutorily trigger the 
mandatory minimum provisions.  We are told that this quantity 
was necessary in order to portray a “credible” stash house in 
the Philadelphia region.   
  
After initiating a plan to rob a stash house with Roc and 
an undercover Agent, Berry presumably enlisted Washington.  
Washington was a resident of the community whom the 
confidential informant had not initially targeted, and he was 
not of any initial interest to the Government based on past 
criminal activity.  
  
I realize, of course, that even though Washington was 
just a secondary target, his statements during the planning 
meetings and subsequent phone conversations show that he 
was neither a shrinking violet nor reluctant recruit.  Rather, 
Washington was clearly interested in participating and even 
offered a number of disturbingly violent ideas that he thought 
would facilitate the planned robbery.   
 
Nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that, “having 
yielded to an extraordinary inducement [Washington] would 
do everything possible to earn the promised reward.”7  
According to the Special Agent’s testimony at trial, a single 
kilogram of cocaine was worth upwards of $40,000, as Berry 
(the person who enlisted Washington) no doubt knew.   
 
Despite the Government’s claim that the 10-kilogram 
quantity was only selected to make the scheme credible, 
nothing suggests that Washington was motivated by any 
knowledge of a specific drug quantity, nor is there any 
evidence of him having any involvement with stash-house 
robberies.8  To the contrary, Washington initially told the 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., Kindle, 698 F.3d at 415 (Posner, J., dissenting).  
8 The Agent had only told Berry that he saw over 10 
kilograms of cocaine inside a cooler when the two men met.  
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group that he did not want to be involved with cocaine.  He 
explained that he “don’t fuck with coke” and that he didn’t 
“really do this shit.”  The Agent understood Washington’s 
claim that he didn’t “really do this . . .” to mean that 
Washington did not deal in home invasion robberies.  Yet, the 
Agent and Roc forged ahead, greasing the skids to involve 
Washington in the criminal conspiracy.  Washington was 
ultimately arrested and charged with conspiracy to possess, and 
attempt to possess, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine with intent 
to distribute after he carried out the Government-contrived 
crime.   
  
Despite Washington’s initial statements of disinterest in 
cocaine and stash-house robberies, I agree that Washington’s 
ultimate actions do establish his intent to carry out an armed 
theft of cocaine from a stash house.  However, that should not 
obscure a more fundamental point.  As another appellate court 
has explained, “[t]he risk [of targeting] . . . generalized 
populations [with stash-house investigations] is that the 
government . . . create[s] a criminal enterprise that would not 
have come into being but for the temptation of a big payday, a 
work of fiction spun out by government agents to persons 
vulnerable to such a ploy who would not otherwise have 
thought of doing such a robbery.”9   
  
Here, the Government created a criminal scheme that 
would not have otherwise existed.  Washington had no prior 
history of stash-house robberies (or violent crimes generally, 
for that matter), and he expressed reluctance to get involved 
with cocaine.  Thus, here, as in similar cases, there is a strong 
possibility that had Washington not been “fooled into 
conspiring and attempting to steal fictitious drugs,”10 he may 
well not have been sucked back into the criminal justice 
system.  This is particularly true because he was not even the 
intended target of this operation.  Despite his criminal past, 
                                                          
The District Court makes no finding that Berry then told 
Washington of the exact quantity of drugs to be obtained in a 
potential stash-house robbery before Washington joined the 
initial planning meeting.   
9 United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 303 (9th Cir. 2013).  
10 United States v. Yuman-Hernandez, 712 F.3d 471, 474 (9th 
Cir. 2013).  
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Washington was not necessarily destined to commit future 
crimes.  “Criminals do sometimes change and get their lives 
back on track,” and, as Judge Posner reminds us, “we don’t 
want the government pushing [criminals] back into a life of 
crime.” 11,12   
 
II. Sentencing in Stash-House Sting Cases 
 
As is all too often the case, not only do stash-house 
stings risk ensnaring those who might otherwise not have 
committed crimes, but also the resulting convictions regularly 
give rise to particularly dubious applications of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences.  Here, as is 
typical of these stings, the Government intentionally set the 
amount of fictitious drugs at a level that substantially increased 
Washington’s sentencing exposure.  
 
                                                          
11 Kindle, 698 F.3d at 415–16 (Posner, J., dissenting).  
 As I suggested earlier, given Washington’s statements 
during this scheme, he is not the best example of someone 
being lured into criminality who may otherwise have 
continued restoring his life in the community.  Nonetheless, 
he still had the support of a family, and at the sentencing 
hearing, his loved ones told the court that Washington, after 
serving time for his first conviction, was “out doing the right 
thing . . . doing really good,” having, for example, acquired 
his own business and taking children in the community to 
baseball games.  Sentencing Tr. 36.  His mother stated: “He 
was doing a lot of good things and how he got caught up in 
that situation is beyond me.”  Id.  
 
 His statements during the scheme notwithstanding, 
concerns that have been expressed about fictitious stash-
house schemes are no less valid.  The tactic still is troubling. 
12 See Alfred Blumstein and Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption 
in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 
47 Criminology 327, 327–59 (2009) (“Recidivism probability 
declines with time ‘clean,’ so some point in time is reached 
when a person with a criminal record, who remained free of 
further contact with the criminal justice system, is of no 
greater risk than a counterpart of the same age [who has no 
criminal record] . . . .”).  
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The potential for mischief and abuse is rewarded and 
encouraged by applying an extraordinarily heavy mandatory 
sanction that I doubt Congress ever intended to apply where no 
drugs exist,13 and where the defendant would not have 
committed a crime without the government’s assistance.  Here, 
the Government decided to charge Washington with a 
conspiracy involving 5 kilograms or more of cocaine.  As the 
majority notes, given that quantity, Washington’s prior 
convictions subjected him to a 20-year mandatory minimum 
sentence.  Accordingly, the District Court concluded that it was 
required to impose the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence 
that Washington received.  
 
 Surely, sentences should bear some rational relationship 
to culpability.  Otherwise, the entire enterprise of criminal 
sanctions is reduced to little more than an abstract matrix of 
numbers and grids.  Yet, on this record, there is absolutely 
nothing to suggest that Washington would not have conspired 
to rob a stash house containing, for example, a kilogram less 
than the 5-kilogram mandatory trigger.  No mandatory 
minimum would have “applied” had this trap been baited with 
the illusion of a stash house containing four kilograms 
(translating roughly to upwards of $160,000 in value based on 
the trial testimony)—thereby placing him beyond the reach of 
the perceived need to impose a 20-year statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence.14   
 
 It is worth repeating that Washington had no prior 
history of robbing stash houses containing any quantity of 
cocaine (let alone 10 kilograms of it), or any history of 
                                                          
13 See infra Part III for a discussion of what, ostensibly, were 
Congress’s original intentions for tying mandatory minimums 
to specific drug quantities.  
14 I recognize that the 5-kilogram cutoff is equally arbitrary 
when defendants are sentenced for a quantity of drugs that 
actually exists.  Some degree of arbitrariness may be 
necessary to any sentencing scheme, and this is no less true 
when sentencing ranges are largely determined by artificially 
constructed Federal Sentencing Guidelines ranges.  However, 
that practical reality does not minimize or negate the very real 
issues of unfairness and the potential for sentencing 
manipulation in these kinds of cases. 
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committing violent crimes.  In addition, as I have noted, he 
initially stated that he did not want to get involved with 
cocaine.  Even if we accept the deterrent value of mandatory 
minimum sentences, it is fanciful to believe that Washington 
would not have been deterred from future criminal activity had 
a much shorter period of incarceration been imposed.  As Judge 
Posner has argued in similar circumstances, if a shorter 
sentence had been imposed, “[could] there be any serious 
concern that upon emerging [from prison, Washington] would 
embark on a career of robbing stash houses? That if approached 
by anyone [subsequently] inviting him to launch such a career 
he would listen to the person?”15  I think not.  
 
 My concern is exacerbated by the fact that very few 
nationally-reported cases of government sting operations or 
investigations specify any fictional amount of cocaine that is 
less than the 5 kilograms that triggers this mandatory minimum 
sentence.  Other courts have recognized this problem.  For 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
noted in another stash-house case:  
 
It is unsettling that in this type of reverse sting, the 
government has a greater than usual ability to 
influence a defendant’s ultimate Guidelines level 
and sentence.  It appears to be no coincidence that 
the [government] chose to [use] no less than [the 
amount of sham cocaine that would trigger as 
much as 78 more months of imprisonment] . . .16    
                                                          
15 Kindle, 698 F.3d at 416 (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the fact that the defendant in that stash-house case was 
imprisoned for 27 years—and proposing that a sentence of 5 
years was “more than adequate,” in part because, as a result 
of the sting, “taxpayers w[ould] be supporting [the defendant] 
at considerable expense for the next quarter century”).  
16 United States v. Caban, 173 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(recognizing the defendant’s argument as one paralleling 
sentence manipulation but concluding that the status of the 
doctrine at the time was unclear).   
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In fact, it is usually the government’s initial scripting of the 
stash-house operations, including the quantity of drugs, that 
automatically subjects defendants to particular sentences.17   
 
 It is very troubling that the government can initiate and 
facilitate criminal conduct, and make strategic choices that 
result in sentences that have a relationship to culpability that 
is, at best, tenuous and theoretical.  As other courts have 
observed, in fictitious stash-house stings, “the government has 
virtually unfettered ability to inflate the amount of drugs” 
involved—in addition to selecting the type of drugs—“thereby 
obtain[ing] a greater sentence for the defendant.”18  The 
government can also “minimize the obstacles that a defendant 
must overcome to obtain the drugs.”19  Though the District 
Court here felt compelled to rely on the fanciful quantity the 
Government selected and to impose the corresponding 20-year 
                                                          
17 It is also the government’s initial scripting of the type of 
drugs that bears on mandatory minimum sentencing. When 
asked about choosing that drug for the sting operation in this 
case, the Government witness described stash-house stings as 
a “technique . . . developed in the 1980s in response to a 
trend,” and that “[m]any of the robbery crews . . . specifically 
target houses where cocaine is stored.”  Trial Tr. 82–83.  
Therefore, “[the sting operation] has to be realistic” and 
“mirror what’s really going on in the streets for them to 
believe it and for our safety.”  Id. at 83.  The witness 
explained that “when you’re talking about the operation of a 
stash house, cocaine lends itself . . . as opposed to say another 
drug like marijuana where—if you’re talking about a large 
scale, typically you’re talking about a grow house or 
something like that.”  Id.   
 
 As discussed, infra, however, my concerns about the 
degree to which such street-informed testimony can be tested 
leave me doubting whether the government must use cocaine 
to achieve its law enforcement objectives.  Here, for example, 
Berry expressed only a general interest in robbing a drug 
stash house without regard for a specific type. 
18 United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010).    
19 Id. at 730. 
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mandatory minimum, “the Government assured such a result 
in advance by the script that it wrote . . . .”20   
 
   My colleagues correctly note that that there was little, 
if any, countervailing evidence for the District Court to 
consider in making the factual determination that the agents 
could have used an amount less than 10 kilograms in creating 
the stash house.21  The only relevant findings stem from the 
undercover Agent’s trial testimony that the 10-kilogram 
amount was selected because that quantity mirrored drug 
weights typically found in stash houses in Philadelphia.  He 
explained that the proposed scenario had to be realistic, lest 
robbery crews question the operation’s legitimacy.  He also 
testified that that quantity was based on a consultation with the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (presumably the Philadelphia 
Division), which, he claimed, provides “experts in this 
information.”22  Apparently, the DEA is “aware of exactly 
what was going on . . . in the Philadelphia Metropolitan region” 
and provided the quantity “based on search warrants and 
investigations that they had conducted.”23   
 
 Another district court considering a stash-house sting 
prosecution using 10 kilograms of cocaine was faced with 
similar government evidence.  However, unlike here, that court 
was able to conclude that “the record [there] [wa]s clear that 
[the defendant] was ‘in for a penny, in for a pound,’”24 and that 
the evidence before it had established that the defendant was 
“‘hungry’ enough to pursue . . .[the] undertaking regardless of 
any specific amount of drugs.” 25  That district court explained 
that “[o]nce the Government established that [the defendant] 
                                                          
20 United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 939 (E.D. 
Pa. 2016).  
21 While it was ultimately the 5 kilograms of cocaine that the 
Superseding Indictment charged that drove Washington’s 20-
year mandatory minimum, the amount the Government 
selected allowed it to charge Washington with conspiring to 
rob 5 kilograms or more, and thereby trigger the mandatory 
minimum.  
22 Trial Tr. 85.  
23 Id.  
24 McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 935.  
25 Id. at 938.   
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was willing to engage in an armed robbery of any quantity 
large enough to resell, its core law enforcement objective was 
met.”26  The court cited to the government’s own testimony 
that “the street value” of a single kilogram of cocaine was 
$36,000 and that stolen narcotics “represent pure profit,” both 
factors that would seem to make the sting “sufficiently alluring 
well below 5 kilograms.”27   
 
 My agreement with the Majority on this specific issue 
notwithstanding, it is nearly impossible for a defendant to ever 
rebut the government’s “expert”-based explanation for why a 
given fictitious quantity is necessary or appropriate.  Accepting 
such testimony at face value invites the mischief I mentioned 
at the outset to drive the sentencing.   The district court is also 
deprived of its well-established sentencing discretion,28 a 
concern compounded by the problems the district court in 
McLean identified:  
 The netherworld of criminal activity is by its very 
nature opaque. For that reason, almost out of 
necessity, law enforcement officers, whose 
experiences give them familiarity with that world, 
are allowed to render certain opinions about use 
of coded language and street slang. When used in 
that way, the opinion testimony is interpretive. In 
stash house sting cases, the Government seeks to 
make [that opinion testimony] dispositive 
because the charges themselves are the product of 
opinion testimony as to 1) the amount of cocaine 
that would be “expected” to be found in a stash 
house, and 2) the necessity of specifying 
substantial amounts to preserve the credibility 
and safety of the operation. There is a third 
unstated premise as well—that the targets of the 
sting would have the same familiarity with the 
                                                          
26 Id. at 935.  
27 Id. at 937.   
28 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 
(1989) (discussing the Sentencing Guidelines and Congress’s 
“strong feeling that sentencing has been and should remain 
primarily a judicial function” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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quantity of narcotics stored at the average stash 
house. 
 By definition, such opinions are supported only 
by personal experience, and the dataset, to the 
extent that one exists, is created by, and only 
accessible to, law enforcement. There are no peer-
reviewed journals within the narcotics trade. 
There is no way to test the premises on which 
these sting operations are based. None of the 
traditional means by which expert testimony can 
be tested in a systematic way apply here, yet 
courts are expected to accept such opinion as the 
justification for undercover operations that 
inexorably and indiscriminately give rise to large 
mandatory minimum sentences. 29 
 
I agree.   
 
 Thus, regardless of whether a claim of sentencing 
manipulation is raised, any proffered evidence about the need 
for a given quantity or type of fictitious drugs deserves a great 
deal more scrutiny than courts give it. 30  Similarly, requiring 
evidence that a defendant only agreed to participate because of 
a given quantity or type of drugs seems more than appropriate.  
Requiring such scrutiny would not eliminate the myriad of 
problems that pervade these fictitious stash-house stings, but it 
would at least help minimize the unfairness that can arise from 
allowing the government to select the drug and the quantity 
that will reap the biggest reward at sentencing with little or no 
fear that a sentencing court would ever question the choices.31  
                                                          
29 Id. at 936–37.   
30 Here, the District Court did not probe the testimony, which, 
as the Majority notes, it certainly was free to do.  Maj. Op. at 
40 n.73.  As the Majority further suggests, had there been 
more fact-finding by the District Court on this issue, some 
deference to the testimony about the drug quantity may have 
been appropriate.  Id. at 41 n.78.      
31 To accept, wholesale, the unsubstantiated rationale that a 
fictitious quantity of drugs matches what is “realistic” in a 
particular geographic region also suggests that defendants 
across the United States could theoretically be subjected to 
12 
 
We should not be “delegat[ing] [sentencing discretion] all the 
way down to the individual drug agent operating in the field.”32   
 
 Scrutinizing the basis for the drug quantity would help 
restore the alignment between culpability and punishment that 
is jettisoned when the government is allowed to control the 
defendant’s sentencing exposure.  “Deeply ingrained in our 
legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the 
criminal conduct . . . the more severely it ought to be 
punished.” 33  Absent unique circumstances not evident here, a 
defendant’s criminal exposure should be linked to actual 
culpability regarding his/her dealings in specific drug 
quantities.   
 
  Insofar as sentencing manipulation is concerned, “[t]he 
question is not whether the underlying criminal conviction is 
lawful, but rather whether there is reason to reduce the sentence 
due to the inducements used by undercover police or their 
agents.” 34  Moreover, “a sentence based on an evaluation of a 
defendant’s culpability for particular offense conduct, which 
includes a consideration of police inducements,” serves the 
retributive goals of “proportional and fair punishment,” is 
“compatible with the consequentialist aims of incapacitation 
and deterrence,”35 and is “directly supported by the systemic 
goal of identifying less blameworthy defendants and mitigating 
their sentences accordingly.”36  These fundamental principles 
of criminal justice necessitate closer scrutiny for schemes that 
originate with, and are driven by, law enforcement because it 
is highly unlikely that the Sentencing Guidelines were intended 
to apply to such circumstances.37  This scrutiny is appropriate 
                                                          
mandatory minimum sentences if the stash-house drug 
quantities allowing for such a sentence happen to be 
“realistic” for those geographic areas, as they apparently are 
in Philadelphia. 
32 United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 
1994).   
33 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987). 
34 Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated 
Culpability, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1401, 1454 (2013). 
35 Id. at 1418 (emphasis added). 
36 Id. at 1420. 
37 See infra Part III. 
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even absent specific evidence that the government “intended” 
to inflate a defendant’s sentence.38    
 
 My colleagues discuss our precedent in United States v 
Twigg39 in rejecting Washington’s claim that the sentence that 
resulted from this scheme is a denial of his constitutional right 
to due process.  I would emphasize, however, that Twigg does 
not defeat any claim of sentencing manipulation.  Indeed, if 
anything, Twigg strongly suggests that we should recognize 
some kind of sentencing factor manipulation claim when 
appropriate.  Although, for reasons the Majority explains, the 
conduct here may not have crossed the due process threshold,40 
                                                          
38 See Tinto, supra n.34 at 1426 (concluding that “in the 
context of a sentencing claim, the requirement of an improper 
[police] motive ignores the needed link between the police 
conduct and the justification for a reduction in sentence” 
because “[r]egardless of whether police officers are explicitly 
making strategic choices based on sentencing laws (and the 
desire to increase a suspect’s sentence), the motivation for the 
law enforcement conduct or the inducements used may or 
may not be relevant from the perspective of assessing the 
defendant’s culpability”). 
39 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
40 I disagree with the Majority’s suggestion that Washington 
has not shown prejudice because Washington’s ultimate 
sentence was significantly below the recommended 
Sentencing Guidelines range.  The Majority, itself, concludes 
that the District Court was “clearly guided by the mandatory 
minimum term on the drug counts in crafting the overall 
sentence.”  Maj. Op. at 33 n.55.  The District Court never 
mentioned whether, or the extent to which, it may have 
departed from the recommended Sentencing Guidelines range 
had it not been required to impose a sentence of at least 20 
years.  
Neither do I find persuasive the distinction the 
Majority makes between this case and McLean, to the extent 
that Washington could rely on that case for whatever 
persuasive value it may have for his due process argument.  
The Majority, for example, discusses that the defendant in 
McLean received a “split” jury verdict on the amount of 
cocaine involved (5 kilograms with regard to conspiracy but 
14 
 
I believe Washington’s sentencing manipulation claim is more 
meritorious than the Majority concludes.   
 
III. Sentencing Factor Manipulation and Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences 
 
 The fact that the sentence was mandatory does not 
necessarily deal a fatal blow to Washington’s sentence 
manipulation claim.  It is difficult to believe that Congress ever 
considered requiring the imposition of a mandatory minimum 
sentence where 1) the sentence is tied to a fictitious drug 
quantity in a criminal endeavor that originates with the 
government, and 2) the defendant would not have engaged in 
the criminal conduct but for the government’s prompting and 
encouragement.   
  
 Congress intended for the 10-year mandatory minimum 
sentences to apply to “major traffickers,”41 i.e., “manufacturers 
or the heads of organizations.” 42  The 5-year mandatory 
minimums were intended to apply to “serious traffickers,” i.e., 
“managers of the retail level traffic . . . in substantial street 
                                                          
500 grams with regard to attempt) and that there was “no 
equivalent ambiguity” in the jury’s verdict for Washington 
here.  But that jury finding, while it highlighted the “inherent 
problems” these prosecutions presented for the district court, 
McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 939, was not one of the “factors” 
that led the court to conclude that enforcing the mandatory 
minimum would “offend due process.”  Id. at 943.  
Regardless of any “ambiguity,” the jury in McLean still found 
the defendant guilty of conspiring to possess 5 kilograms or 
more of cocaine which, “absent some constitutional 
prohibition,”  purportedly  “bound” the district court—like 
the District Court here—to a mandatory minimum sentence.  
Id. at 938.   
41 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to the Congress: 
Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, 119 (1995).  
42 H.R. Rep. No. 99-845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1986, 1986 
WL 295596; see also 132 Cong. Rec. 27, 193–94 (daily ed. 
Sept. 30, 1996); 132 Cong. Rec. 22, 993 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 
1986).  
42 H.R. Rep. No. 99-845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1986, 1986 
WL 295596  
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quantities.”43  Despite Congress’s intention for mandatory 
minimums to reflect culpability based on drug quantities, the 
law instead has, over time, targeted low-level offenders (e.g., 
street-level dealers and couriers) more often than high-level 
offenders.44  For example, in 2009, offenders sentenced for 
relatively minor roles represented the biggest share of federal 
drug offenders, while the highest-level traffickers made up a 
comparatively small share of federal drug offenders.45  The 
disconnect is not explained by the fact that there are more low-
level dealers than high-level traffickers.  The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission itself concluded in 2011 that “the quantity of 
drugs involved in an offense is not as closely related to the 
offender’s function in the offense as perhaps Congress 
expected.”46   
                                                          
43 Id.  
44 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to the Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal 
Justice System, Appendix D, Figure D-22, available at 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congression
al-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-
penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Appendix_D.pdf; see U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to the Congress: 
Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, 20–21, 85 (May 
2007).  See also Deborah Young, Rethinking the 
Commission’s Drug Guidelines: Courier Cases where 
Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 63 (1990) 
(tracking the disproportionate severity of quantity-based 
penalties for lower-level drug offenders and further observing 
that the quantity-based Sentencing Guidelines often apply to 
defendants less culpable than the key drug players, who are 
the “primary targets of the laws”). 
45 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to the Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal 
Justice System (October 2011), Appendix D, Figure D-22, 
available at 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congression
al-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-
penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Appendix_D.pdf.   
46 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to the Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal 
Justice System, 350, (October 2011) available at 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congression
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 Thus, there is no reason to believe that Congress 
anticipated—much less intended—for quantity-based 
mandatory minimums to reflexively apply in stash-house cases 
where, as here, the defendant is not only a low-level “drug” 
offender, but also became involved with non-existent drugs at 
the government’s urging.   The circumstances of such phony 
stings will rarely lend themselves to a mandatory minimum 
sentence, or suggest that Congress intended a mandatory 
minimum to apply.  Concluding otherwise risks both 
perverting the congressional intent behind the mandatory 
minimums and, as I have explained, circumventing federal 
judges’ traditional sentencing authority.47  
  
 Moreover, applying mandatory sentences where the 
criminal conduct and the type and quantity of drugs exist only 
in the law enforcement’s fertile imagination, rather than an 
offender’s actual possession, defeats the congressional intent 
of requiring judges to impose sentences that are guided by the 
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  In United States v. Olhovsky, 
we stressed that “[18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) clearly states that a 
court must impose a sentence that is ‘sufficient but not greater 
than necessary, to comply with the purposes of 
[sentencing].’”48  We there quoted the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that this requirement, referred to as “the parsimony 
provision,” is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s ‘“overarching 
instruction.’”49  
                                                          
al-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-
penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_12.pdf.  
47 My discussion is limited to sentences imposed as 
punishment for involvement in a phony stash-house sting.  I 
do not intend to suggest that a sentence designed primarily to 
incapacitate is necessarily inappropriate.  Such sentences may 
be necessary for the protection of the community in rare 
circumstances.  However, phony stash-house stings will 
rarely, if ever, present a court with such circumstances, and 
when they do, I have every confidence that the district court 
will sentence accordingly.  
48 562 F.3d 530, 547 (3d Cir. 2009), as amended (May 5, 
2009). 
49 Id. at 548 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 
85, 111 (2008)).   
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Despite our conclusion that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)’s 
mandatory minimum sentence provision does not conflict with 
§ 3553(a)’s parsimony provision,50 abandoning the “demand of 
parsimony that is the overarching instruction of the 
congressionally mandated sentencing factors”51 seems an 
unintended result in phony drug stings.  There are no drugs that 
would otherwise endanger the community, and the criminal 
conspiracy probably would never have been hatched but for 
law enforcement’s intervention and direction.  Congress could 
not have intended courts to impose otherwise applicable 
mandatory minimum sentences—which we have described as 
“draconian”52—where the criminal conduct is the result of the 
government’s initiative, rather than a defendant’s.  I also find 
it hard to believe that Congress would create exceptions to 
mandatory minimums that spare actual drug traffickers 
exposure to draconian sentences53 while intending those same 
harsh sanctions to apply when the government lured a 
defendant into being involved with drugs that never even 
                                                          
50 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 85 (3d Cir. 
2007) (finding that there is no conflict between § 3553 and a 
mandatory minimum sentence provision because “§ 3553(a) 
must be read in conjunction with [] § 3553(e), which prohibits 
courts from sentencing a defendant below the statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence unless the Government files a 
motion permitting such departure”). 
51 Olhovsky, 562 F.3d at 548 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).    
52 See United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 250, 258 (3d Cir. 
2002).  
53 In Williams, we addressed one of those exceptions—
Congress’s enactment of the “safety valve” in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(f).  Id.  It is not surprising that Congress did not 
include situations such as phony stash-house stings in the 
statutory exceptions for applying mandatory minimum 
sentences; Congress likely never contemplated that situation.  
Williams accurately characterizes the lengths of mandatory 
minimums as “draconian,” and exceptions like 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(f)’s safety valve, and § 3553(e) (granting authority 
upon government motion), at minimum, evince Congress’s 
intention that the mandatory sentences need not always be 
imposed. 
18 
 
existed. 
  
 In addressing Congress’s intent, I recognize that there is 
no ambiguity on the face of the mandatory minimum 
sentencing statute.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) does not distinguish 
between roles in a narcotics conspiracy, nor does it require that 
drugs actually exist.54  That is not surprising, as it would have 
taken something approaching clairvoyance for Congress to 
foresee that these severe sentences would extend to situations 
where drugs were not actually involved.  In any event, it is, of 
course, axiomatic that “[w]hen Congress establishes a 
minimum sentence for a particular crime, district courts are 
required to sentence defendants guilty of that crime to a term 
of imprisonment no less than the Congressionally prescribed 
minimum, unless an explicit exception to the minimum 
sentence applies.”55  But as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit explained, “[c]onceptually, . . . an adjustment 
for sentencing factor manipulation is not a departure” that the 
mandatory minimum statute would otherwise forbid.56  This is 
because “[w]hen a court filters the manipulation out of the 
sentencing calculus before applying a sentencing provision, no 
mandatory minimum would arise in the first place.”57   
  
 Ironically, it may well be the lay testimony of Rashida 
Clover, Washington’s sister and former caretaker, that best 
expresses the arbitrariness of applying the mandatory sentence 
                                                          
54 As the Government points out, there are only two 
circumstances under which a district court can depart 
downward from a statutorily authorized mandatory minimum 
sentence: the government must file a motion to recognize the 
defendant’s “substantial assistance,” or the defendant must 
fall within the provisions of the “safety valve” embodied in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  See, e.g., United States v. Kellum, 356 
F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004). 
55 United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 
2011); see also United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 113 
(3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the “exceptions are the only 
authority a district court has to depart below a mandatory 
minimum” (quoting Kellum, 356 F.3d at 289)).   
56 United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 
2007).  
57 Id.  
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where the government initiates the crime and no drugs are 
involved.  At Washington’s sentencing hearing, she remarked:  
20 years? My brother . . . [has] already spent half 
of his life in jail. . . . That’s not doing anything. 
. . . It’s not rehabilitating him. . . . What he needs 
is education and an opportunity. . . . I understand 
that [the District Court has] guidelines to go by, 
but . . . I can’t imagine that . . . [the] Guideline 
book said . . . to go out and entrap young men 
who are not organized in organized crime and 
sentence people for fake drugs and put their own 
limitations on the amount of the drugs just to 
give them a [minimum] 20 years sentence or 
more. . . . I hardly think whoever created that 
book meant for this to happen. I feel like the 
system is being manipulated by that. And it’s . . 
. embarrassing and it’s hurtful because a lot of 
people are being affected by this. This is not just 
my brother. . . .This is about a lot of people in our 
communities that are affected by this. They 
really are.58 
 
 I agree that applying mandatory minimum sentences in 
cases where no drugs exist and the government originates and 
perpetuates the criminal activity creates such an unfair and 
irrational divergence between culpability and conduct that 
Congress could hardly have intended the result.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
  
 This case is the latest illustration of why federal courts 
across the country continue to find the government’s reliance 
on phony stash-house sting operations disturbing.  As I have 
explained, these cases raise serious issues of fairness while 
destroying the fundamental relationship between culpability 
and punishment that is so important to sentencing.  The 
conduct being sanctioned is the direct result of the 
government’s initiative rather than the defendant’s. 
  
 I reiterate that it is exceedingly difficult to conclude that 
Congress ever considered that mandatory minimum sentences 
                                                          
58 Sentencing Tr. 36.   
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would apply here.  Nevertheless, it just may be that the ultimate 
systematic resolution of this very troublesome approach to 
sentencing will have to await clarification by Congress, the 
Sentencing Commission,59 or the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Meanwhile, it is worth echoing my colleagues’ caution:  The 
Government’s success today should not be interpreted as a clue 
that “all such prosecutions will share the same fate” in the 
future.60  
  
 Hopefully, this problem will be resolved by one of the 
authorities I have just mentioned.  Until that day comes, we are 
left with the very poignant observation of Ms. Clover, who has 
experienced our sentencing laws “up close and personal.”  As 
quoted earlier, she was skeptical that “whoever created that 
[Sentencing Guidelines] book meant for this to happen,” and 
                                                          
59 The Sentencing Commission has already “recognized the 
potential for government agents to use their knowledge of the 
Sentencing Guidelines to manipulate the quantity of drugs 
sold in a reverse sting in order to increase a defendant’s 
sentence.”  United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245–46  
(8th Cir. 1996) (discussing how under Application Note 17 of 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(17), a district court can depart 
downward when law enforcement agents set a price below 
market that allows the defendant to purchase a significantly 
larger quantity of drugs, and that Application Note 12 of 
§ 2D1.1 instructs a district court to remove from the 
sentencing calculation the amount that a defendant is unable 
to produce if the produced amount is less than negotiated).  
The provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines in place “show[ ] 
that the Sentencing Commission is aware of the unfairness 
and arbitrariness of allowing drug enforcement agents to put 
unwarranted pressure on a defendant in order to increase his 
or her sentence without regard for his predisposition, his 
capacity to commit the crime on his own, and the extent of his 
culpability.”  United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 
(9th Cir. 1994).  But the “Sentencing Commission’s 
determination that the defendant may receive a downward 
departure when the government artificially lowers the price of 
the drugs . . . only addresses one of the ways in which drug 
enforcement agents are able to manipulate sentences.”  Id. 
60 Maj. Op. at 42. 
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that “the system is being manipulated by that.”61  She added 
that it is “embarrassing and it’s hurtful because a lot of people 
are being affected by this.”62  And so they are.  
                                                          
61 Sentencing Tr. 36.   
62 Id.  
